Louisiana\u27s Natural Death Act and Dilemmas in Medical Ethics by Vitiello, Michael
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 46 | Number 2
November 1985
Louisiana's Natural Death Act and Dilemmas in
Medical Ethics
Michael Vitiello
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Michael Vitiello, Louisiana's Natural Death Act and Dilemmas in Medical Ethics, 46 La. L. Rev. (1985)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol46/iss2/4
LOUISIANA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT
AND DILEMMAS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
Michael Vitiello*
In 1984, Louisiana joined the trend towards legislative recognition
of a right to refuse medical treatment.' The need for legislative action
in this area is generally acknowledged: courts have frequently requested
legislative guidance to resolve issues presented by withdrawal or denial
of questionable medical treatment.2 The public shares an interest in the
Copyright 1986, by Louisiana Law Review.
* professor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans.
1. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1 - 58.10 (Supp. 1985). 1985 La. Acts No. 187 amended and
renacted La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1 through 1299.58.8 and enacted 1299.58.1A.
As of 1983, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had enacted natural death
acts. These states included: Alabama, Ala. Code §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); Arkansas,
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-3801 to -3802 (Supp. 1985); California, Cal. Ann. Health & Safety
Code 99 7185-7195 (Supp. 1985); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2501(e) (1983);
Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. §§ 39.4501-.4508 (1985); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-28, 101-
109 (1980); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 449.540.690 (1983); New Mexico, N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 24-7-1 to -7-11 (Supp. 1981); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-320 to -
323 (1985); Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 97.050-.090 (1984); Texas, Tex. Stat. Ann. art.
4590(h) (1985); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5252-5262 (Supp. 1985); and Washington,
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.122.010-.122.905 (Supp. 1985). See President's Commission
for the study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego
Life-Sustaining Treatment at 318-87 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report].
Since 1983, many more states including Louisiana, have followed suit. Among them
are Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (Supp. 1985); Colorado, Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 15-18-101 to -103 (Supp. 1985); Florida, Fla. Stat: Ann. §§ 765.01-.15
(Supp. 1985); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Supp. 1984); Illinois, Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 110 1/2, 701-709 (Supp. 1985); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -11-
12 (Supp. 1985); Iowa, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. p. 2 (West) (Senate File 25); Maine, Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2921 (Supp. 1985); Maryland, Md. Health Gen. Code Ann.
§§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1985); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp.
1985); Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010 (Supp. 1985); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 137H:l to -16 (Supp. 1985); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 3101
(Supp. 1985); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-101 (Supp. 1985); Utah, Utah Code
Ann. § 75-2-1101 (Supp. 1985); Virginia, Va. Code §§ 54-325:8.1-8.13 (Supp. 1984); West
Virginia, W. Va. Code 16-30-1 to -30-10 (Supp. 1984); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. §§
154.01 to -. 15 (Supp. 1984); and Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-26-144 to -152 (Supp.
1985).
Several additional states have durable power of attorney statutes which allow a person
to appoint an agent specifically to make medical decisions on his behalf if he becomes
incompetent. See Commission Report, supra, at 146-46, 393-422.
2. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1346 (Del. 1980)
(inviting the legislature's "prompt attention" to enact state policy governing these matters);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980) (stating that this type of issue is
addressed better in a legislative forum); accord In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344-45, 486,
A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 (1981) (emphasizing that enlargement of the judiciary's role in these
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subject. Many people have executed "living wills," 3 even without ena-
bling legislation, in the hope of being spared unwanted treatment. 4 Well-
drafted legislation permits a patient or a surrogate to assert the patient's
rights without the burden of litigation.' Such legislation assists health
care providers to establish policies governing withdrawal or denial of
treatment. 6 Further, it frees them from concern about criminal and civil
liability in cases where termination of treatment leads to a patient's
death. 7
situations, if desirable, should be made by the legislature); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 139, 660 P.2d 738, 752 (1983) (inviting the legislature to address this "sensitive"
issue).
3. The terms "living will," "advance directive," and "declaration" are used inter-
changeably to refer to a document which "lets people anticipate that they may be unable
to participate in future decisions about their own health care." See Commission Report,
supra note 1, at 136. The Commission Report distinguishes between an "instruction
directive," which "specifies the types of care a person wants (or does not want to
receive);" and a "proxy directive," which "specifies the surrogate a person wants to
make such decisions if the person is ever unable to do so." Id. Most living wills circulated
by right-to-die groups or authorized by statute are "instruction directives," rather than
"proxy directives," despite some clear advantages provided by "proxy directives." Id. at
145-51.
4. One group, Concern for Dying, has circulated millions of copies of standard
form "living wills." See Questions and Answers About the Living Wills (pamphlet)
(Concern for Dying, New York), cited by Commission Report, supra note 1, at 139, nn.
49, 52. This concern is, in part, motivated by dramatic advances in medical technology
which may be able to, delay the moment of death although not curing the patient's
underlying illness. Id. at 1 n.l.
5. Apart from the obvious cost of litigation, judicial proceedings frequently resolve
the dispute after the patient has died. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth,
452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984) (patient died over three years before final decision); In
re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 341, 486 A.2d 1209, 1219 (1985) (patient died before New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 369, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (consolidated cases in which both patients died prior to the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
6. See, e.g., Bayley, Who Should Decide, in Legal and Ethical Aspects of Treating
Terminally Ill Patients, 3, 10-I1 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Legal and Ethical Aspects] (commentary on living will legislation); Van Scoy-Mosher, An
Oncologist's Case for No-Code Orders, id. at 14, 17 (discussing drafting of guidelines
for writing order not to resuscitate); Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint,
4 Am. J.L. & Med. 233, 242 (1978) (stating that physicians should seek legislative protection
in cases involving denial or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
7. See, e.g., Oakes, A Prosecutor's View of Treatment Decisions, in Legal and
Ethical Aspects, supra note 6, at 194, 199 (withdrawal of life support could subject
physicians to criminal liability); Robertson, Legal Aspects of Withdrawing Medical Treat-
ment from Handicapped Children, id. at 213, 217-18 (liability of attending physician
regarding defective newborns); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns:
A Legal Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 224-35 (1975) (discussing criminal liability of
physicians and other health care providers that refuse ordinary lifesaving medical care for
defective infants). It is generally assumed that the risk of criminal or civil suit in such
cases is quite low. See, e.g., Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 667, 669-71
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Despite this trend, natural death acts may have created more problems
than they solve. As observed by a leading commentator on medical
ethics, "[t]he intent of these statutes is simple, . . . [to] mak[e] 'Living
Wills' legally binding documents. Yet the resulting statutes are, in my
view, so cumbersome and restrictive as to be useless at best, and possibly
very mischievous." 8 Some statutes, for example, are so narrow that the
almost never apply to the cases confronting patients and care providers.9
Further, health care providers and courts may construe statutory provi-
sions as constituting a seriously ill patient's exclusive rights, leading to
inappropriate treatment of the dying patient.'" Indeed, provisions of Loui-
siana's natural death act have already been amended to correct a
misreading of the act." Apparently on advice of counsel, health care pro-
viders routinely compelled parents of seriously ill minors to seek court
approval to authorize the hospital to terminate nonbeneficial life-sustaining
treatment. 'I2
Natural death acts are seldom drafted to answer all of the complex
moral dilemmas that have arisen when patients or their surrogates have
resisted treatment. 3 Over the past decade courts, acting to fill a legislative
void, have established a right to refuse medical treatment.14 At the same
(arguing that law in action is vastly different from law on the books, and rioting An
absence of criminal and neglect proceedings in cases involving seriously ill newborns).
There is evidence, however, that the threat of suit is increasingly real. See, e.g., United
States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (suit by government
to compel production of medical records for seriously ill newborn), aff'dj 729 F.2d 244
(2d Cir. 1984); Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E..2d 1-186, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63 (suit by "stranger" to compel treatment of seriously ill new born), Cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983).
8. Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical' Distinctions in Framing Law 6n
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 647, 652. Professor Capron was, the' Ex-
ecutive Director of the, President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Probleis inf
Medicine and Biomedical Research.
9. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7188., 7194(b) (Supp'. 19855 (requiring.
re-execution of declaration at least 14 days after diagrtosis of terminalt illness). See Com-
mission Report, supra note 1, at 142-43 (The California: act is, very narrow because few
patients will remain, competent fourteen days after diagnosis, that deatfi i's irminent.).
10. See Commission, Report, supra note, f, at 1144-45 (suggesting that health care,
providers may view' a natural death act as the exclusive means. to, impl ement a decision
to forego treatment despite legislative declaimery.
11. See 1985 La. Acts No. 187, amending La. R.S. 4:.'299.58..
12. See Vitiello, Letting Seriously Ill Minors Die: A Review of Louisi'ana,'s, Natural
Death; Act, 31 Loy. L. Rev. 67 (1985) (discussing crisis in, health' carel for dy'ing fffinors.
caused by misunderstanding of Louisiana's" natural death act)'.
13. See infra notes 255-364 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical; Center,, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del.. 1980y
(holding that surrogate, may authorize withdrawal, of life-support system, even, absent
legislation, based' on, constitutional' right of privacy); Satz v.. Perlmutter,, 62 So . 2 160
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App,. 1978), aff'd,. 379' So. 2d 359 (Fla,. 1980) (holdhing that c6mpetent.
patient has right to refuse medical' treatment,, even absent legislationl, basedf oil righf to
1985]
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time, commentators and courts have tried to reconcile that right with
traditional prohibitions against suicide and euthanasia. 5 Thus, a patient's
right to resist medical treatment cannot be understood solely by reference
to recent natural death acts.
This article analyzes Louisiana's natural death act from several
perspectives. Section one discusses important provisions of the Act and
its recent amendments. The second section contrasts Louisiana's act with
representative legislation from other jurisdictions.' 6 Section three analyzes
whether the Act violates the prohibition against euthanasia." Section
four discusses some problems that have arisen in other jurisdictions and
analyzes how those cases might be resolved in Louisiana.'" Finally, section
five discusses some shortcomings of the Act, most notably its provisions
governing withdrawal of treatment from seriously ill minors.' 9 Despite
these failings, this article concludes that Louisiana's statute, as amended,
is one of the most enlightened natural death acts to date.
A REVIEW OF LOUISIANA's NATURAL DEATH ACT 20
As originally enacted, Louisiana's natural death act recognized that
it was a fundamental right of all competent adults "to control the
privacy); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (holding that guardian may
request removal of artificial feeding device under appropriate circumstances, even absent
legislation, based on right to privacy).
15. See, e.g., Satz, 362 So. 2d at 162 (declining life-sustaining treatment is not suicide
because death is primarily the result of underlying disease, not self-inflicted injury); In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 51-52, 355 A.2d 647, 669-70 (death resulting from exercise of
constitutional right of privacy is not homicide), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See
also Cantor, Quinlan Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 Rutgers
L. Rev. 243, 263 (1977) (criminal culpability is absent because no affirmative duty owed
to patient based on good medical practice). But see Kamisar, A Life Not (Or No Longer)
Worth Living: Are We Deciding the Issue Without Facing It? (Mitchell Lecture delivered
at the State University of New York at Buffalo, Nov. 10, 1977) (arguing that in Quinlan,
the New Jersey Supreme Court authorized involuntary euthanasia without acknowledging
that fact).
16. See infra notes 92-151 and accompanying text.
17. La. Const. art. I, § 20 (1974) provides, inter alia, that "no law shall subject
any person to euthanasia . See infra notes 152-254 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 255-364 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 365-435 and accompanying text.
20. Passage of Louisiana's natural death act was the culmination of several unsuc-
cessful previous attempts to do so. The following account appears in an unpublished
paper by Judge P.J. Laborde, Jr., entitled "Death with Dignity: A Proposed Natural
Death Act for Louisiana":
The introduction of House Bill 996 marks the fourth attempt in Louisiana to
enact a statute providing for living wills. House Bill 1240 of 1977 by Repre-
sentative Hainkel and House Bill 1085 of 1978 by Representative Leblanc were
never scheduled for hearing in committee. Senate Bill 578 of 1977 was a duplicate
of House Bill 1240. It died in senate committee. One other measure, Senate
Bill 113 of 1979 by Senator Casey was introduced and it also died in committee.
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decisions relating to their own medical care," most importantly, in
instances when that person was suffering from "a terminal and irre-
versible condition."'" The Act was intended to prevent a patient's "loss
of individual and personal dignity '"22 by recognizing a competent adult's
right "to make an oral or written declaration" designating a surrogate
to make treatment decisions for the patient or instructing specific treat-
ment to be withdrawn 3.2 The Act went further, however, and established
procedures for incompetent patients who had not made declarations24
and for terminally ill minors. 25 Finally, the Act was also intended to
clarify the rights and duties of health care professionals 26 and life in-
surance companies" when an insured patient dies as a result of the
withdrawal of medical treatment.
Recent amendments make clear that the Act applies to all persons,
not merely to competent adults. 21 More importantly, the legislature has
underscored the fact that recourse to a declaration is not "the exclusive
means by which life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or with-
drawn." '29 Health care professionals are not required to apply "medically
inappropriate treatment" to a patient in cases where he or his family
has not executed a declaration.30 That is, physicians, patients, and pa-
tients' families may continue to make critical medical decisions based
on patients' best interests without complying with the Act: compliance
with the act is "voluntary," and "making of a declaration . . . is merely
illustrative as a means of documenting a patient's decisions relative to
withholding . . ." treatment.3'
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.58.3 governs the execution and
form of a declaration, and notification of its existence. A competent
adult may execute a written declaration at any time, not merely after
In 1983, the House of Representatives failed to report favorably on H.B. 996,
Reg. Sess. 1983; instead, it referred the bill for joint study by both houses of
the legislature. House Concurrent Study Request No. 30 (1983). The act as
passed mirrors H.B. 996, with minor modifications. Compare H.B. 996, Reg.
Sess. 1983, with S.B. 271, Reg. Sess. 1984.
21. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(A) (Supp. 1986).
22. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(B) (Supp. 1986).
23. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(C) (Supp. 1986).
24. La. R.S. 40:1299.59.5 (Supp. 1986).
25. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986).
26. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.7-.58.8 (Supp. 1986).
27. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10 (Supp. 1986).
28. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(A) (Supp. 1986) (changing "all competent adults"
to "all persons"); La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(C) (Supp. 1986) (recognizing the right of "such
persons," not just of "a competent adult," as originally promulgated).
29. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(D) (Supp. 1986); see also La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1A(A)-(C)
(Supp. 1986) (clarifying intent of the Act).
30. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(D) (Supp. 1986).
31. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1A(C) (Supp. 1986).
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she is confronted with a diagnosis of terminal illness.32 To be valid
under the statute, a declaration must be signed in the presence of two
witnesses." The witnesses must be competent adults, neither related to
the declarant nor entitled to any portion of the estate of the person
from whom treatment is to be withdrawn.' The witnesses are to guar-
antee that the declarant's signature is authentic, and, apparently, to
attest that the declarant is of sound mind." The statute does not require
a declaration to be reexecuted at any time.36
Section 1299.58.3(B) of the Act places responsibility on the declarant
to notify her attending physician that she has made a declaration. If
the declarant is unable to do so, any other person may notify the
physician.37 The physician must then make the declaration a part of the
declarant's medical records. If the declaration is oral, the physician must
include in the medical records an explanation of why the patient could
not make a written declaration.38
The statute provides a standard form declaration.3 9 That form, in
essence, provides that upon a diagnosis of a terminal and irreversible
illness, life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn. The
form is not mandatory and "may include other specific directions in-
cluding" appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker.40
The statute also permits a patient to make an oral declaration."
Like the written declaration, an oral declaration must be made in the
presence of two witnesses. By contrast, the statute contains several
additional safeguards. An oral declaration must also be witnessed by
32. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986).
33. Id.
34. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(9) (Supp. 1986). That provision originally barred the pa-
tient's attending physician, and any employee of the physician or health care facility from
serving as a witness.
35. The definition section of the Act does not explain the function of the witness.
Id. But the sample form provides as follows: "The declarant has been personally known
to me and I believe him or her to be of sound mind." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (Supp.
1986). That is the preferred role for a witness. See Commission Report, supra note 1,
at 149.
36. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986) (providing that any adult may prepare a
declaration at any time; no provision is made for re-execution of the document).
37. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(B) (Supp. 1986) provides in part:
It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to notify his attending physician
that a declaration has been made. In the event the declarant is comatose,
incompetent, or otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communication,
any other person may notify the physician of the existence of the declaration.
Any attending physician who is so notified shall promptly make the declaration
or copy of the declaration, if written, a part of the declarant's medical record.
38. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(B) (Supp. 1986).
39. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (Supp. 1986).
40. Id. The Act also provides that a specific invalid directive is severable from valid
instructions; La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(C)(2) (Supp. 1986).
41. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 46
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the attending physician. It is not binding unless it is made after a
diagnosis of a terminal and irreversible condition. 42 Prior to passage,
the Act was amended to require that the reasons why the declarant
could not make a written declaration be included in the patient's medical
records, and that the content of the oral declaration also be recited in
the medical records. 43
Revocation of either written or oral declaration is appropriately easy:
(1) a declarant may destroy or direct that another person destroy the
document; 41 (2) he may make a signed and dated written revocation; 41
or (3) he may revoke the prior declaration orally . 6
Although all natural death acts provide for a written declaration,
the more common problem faced by health care professionals, families,
and courts is whether treatment should be withdrawn from an incom-
petent patient who has not made a declaration.4 7 The Louisiana statute
provides for a procedure in such cases when a patient, incapable of
making a treatment decision, is diagnosed as terminally and irreversibly
ill. 41 Originally applicable only to adults, the Act was amended to apply
to all qualified patients. 49
A declaration may be made on behalf of an incompetent ° only after
he is declared a "qualified patient." 5 The declaration may be made by
42. Id.
43. The Act provides: "If the declaration is oral, the physician shall promptly make
a recitation of the reasons the declarant could not make a written declaration and make
the recitation a part of the patient's medical records." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(B)(4) (Supp.
1986). Prior to amendment, House Bill 996 provided simply: "If the declaration is oral,
the physician shall promptly make the fact of such declaration a part of the patient's
medical record." H.B. 996, Reg. Sess. (1983).
44. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.4(1) (Supp. 1986).
45. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.4(2)(a) (Supp. 1986).
46. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.4(3)(a) (Supp. 1986).
47. See Rosoff, Living Wills and Natural Death Acts, in Legal and Ethical Aspects,
supra note 6, at 186, 191 (stating that statutes reviewed fail to meet "one of the most
pressing societal needs . . . what to do . . . where the individual has not executed a
document and is in a persistent vegetative state.").
48. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5 (Supp. 1986).
49. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986). That section was amended, deleting the
requirement that a patient be "an adult," to apply to "a qualified patient." But more
particular provisions apply to similarly situated "minors." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp.
1986). Presumably if a minor did not have a, spouse or parents to act as a surrogate as
provided in La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986), provisions of La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(1),
(5), & (6) (Supp. 1986) would apply.
50. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986). Incompetence can arise from being com-
atose, from any other physical or mental condition which renders a person "incapable
of communication," or from minority. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A), 1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986).
51. Id. The Act defines a "qualified patient" as "a patient diagnosed and certified
in writing as having a terminal and irreversible condition by two physicians, one of whom
shall be the attending physician, who have personally examined the patient." La. R.S.
40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1986).
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specified individuals "in the following order of priority, if there is no
individual in a prior class ... reasonably available, willing and competent
to act: ' 5 2 first, a judicially appointed tutor or curator;53 second, the
patient's spouse if not judicially separated;5 4 third, an adult child or
adult children;" fourth, the patient's parents;5 6 fifth, a sibling;5 7 sixth,
any other ascendants or descendants." The declaration must be made
before at least two witnesses. 9 In cases involving children, parents,
siblings, or other relatives, the decision must apparently be unanimous. 60
The Act provides more detailed provisions for terminally ill minors.
Section 1299.58.6(A) indicates that a minor may not prepare a decla-
ration. 6' Instead, if a minor is terminally and irreversibly ill,62 a document
may be executed on behalf of the minor. The document may be executed
only (1) by the minor's spouse, "if [the spouse] has reached the age
of majority"; 63 or (2) absent a qualifying spouse, by "either the parent
or guardian of the minor."4 The appropriate party may not execute a
declaration, quite sensibly, if the terminally ill minor objects. 6 More
difficult to justify is the provision that a parent or guardian may not
execute the document "if he has actual notice of opposition by either
another parent or guardian, or a spouse who has attained the age of
majority.' 66
52. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986).
53. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(1) (Supp. 1986).
54. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(2) (Supp. 1986).
55. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(3) (Supp. 1986).
56. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(4) (Supp. 1986).
57. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(5) (Supp. 1986).
58. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(6) (Supp. 1986).
59. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(B) (Supp. 1986). The purpose for the presence of these
witnesses is difficult to determine. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(9) (Supp. 1986), defining "witness,"
does not require that a witness possess medical knowledge, but does disqualify a relative
and people who are entitled to a portion of the declarant's estate. La. R.S. 40: 1299.58.2(9)
(Supp. 1986). Thus the witness may not be qualified to confirm the diagnosis and may
be a stranger to the parties.
60. The Act provides: "If there is more than one person within the above named
class in paragraphs (3) through (6), then the declaration shall be made by all of that
class available for consultation upon good faith efforts to secure participation of all of
that class." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986).
61. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A) (Supp. 1986) provides that certain individuals may
prepare a declaration on the minor's behalf. Section 1299.58.3, allowing execution of a
declaration by a person on his own behalf is limited to "any adult person." La. R.S.
40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986).
62. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A) (Supp. 1986) requires that the minor be a "qualified
patient" before the document may be executed on his behalf. In turn, a "qualified
patient" is one who is "diagnosed and certified in writing as having a terminal and
irreversible condition." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1986).
63. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A)(1) (Supp. 1986).
64. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A)(2) (Supp. 1986).
65. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(1) (Supp. 1986).
66. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(2) (Supp. 1986). For criticism of these provisions, see
infra notes 389-435 and accompanying text.
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Prior to recent amendments, the Act required judicial supervision
in any case in which the minor's surrogates chose to execute a declaration
pursuant to section 1299.58.6.67 The statute did not clearly state the
purpose of the district court's involvement.
6
Despite language to the contrary, 69 lawyers for some health care
providers counselled their clients that court proceedings were necessary
in all cases in which a family sought to terminate or to resist life-
sustaining procedures for a terminally ill minor. 70 That interpretation of
the Act led to unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into treatment
decisions properly left to the affected parties. 7'
Recent amendments were aimed primarily at correcting that mis-
understanding of the Act. Thus, the amendments now permit the ap-
propriate decisionmaker 2 to prepare a declaration on behalf of a minor
67. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(D) (Supp. 1986), deleted in recent amendments, provided
that "[Any person executing a declaration pursuant to the provisions of this Section
shall petition the district court in the parish in which the minor is domiciled or the parish
in which the minor is being maintained for certification upon the face of the document."
68. The Act stated that the district court shall certify the document upon its face if
"all requirements of this Part have been satisfied and ... the document was executed
in good faith." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(D)(4) (Supp. 1986). The court was required to
appoint an attorney to represent the minor, but an evidentiary hearing was optional. La.
R.S. 40:1299.58.6(D)(2) (Supp. 1986). The purpose of the evidentiary hearing was unclear.
Provisions governing adults contemplate judicial proceedings only if no appropriate family
member is available, and then for the limited purpose of appointing a surrogate deci-
sionmaker, not for determining the merits of whether the patient should have treatment
or of whether the patient would want treatment. That is so because La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6
(Supp. 1986) may have contemplated a far broader role for the court. The court may
have been required to conduct a hearing on the merits. That is because La. R.S.
40:1299.58.6(D) (Supp. 1986) required the appointment of an attorney for the minor and
made permissive the holding of an evidentiary hearing. Id. The purpose of the hearing
was not specified, but it would offer opportunity for a challenge to the proposed course
of treatment.
69. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A) (Supp. 1986) provided, in relevant part: "If a minor
has been certified as a qualified patient, the following individuals may execute the document
on his behalf."
70. See, e.g., Impact Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 39, Nov. 16, 1985, in which an attorney
for the Louisiana Hospital Association stated that the Act "is considered by several
attorneys, including myself, to be mandatory. It is written to encompass all situations
and is perceived to include 'no code' and 'Do not resuscitate situations.!" Thus, he
advised: "If a No Code or DNR order is issued, there should be documentation in the
record substantiating such an order. That documentation should include a copy of the
'living will' executed by the patient or someone authorized by the patient or by law to
act on the patient's behalf." See also Decision to Allow Child to Die Not Theirs Alone,
Parents Find, New Orleans Times Picayune-States Item, Dec. 2, 1984, at Al (quoting
several New Orleans physicians and hospital attorneys who believed that the Act required
futile treatment for dying minors, absent a court-approved living will).
71. See Vitiello, supra note 12. Louisiana's Attorney General gave the Act a sensible
interpretation, rejecting the view that the Act was mandatory. See A. G. Opin. 85-57
(Jan. 28, 1985).
72. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A) (Supp. 1986) allows (1) "the spouse if he has
reached the age of majority;" or, absent a qualifying spouse, (2) "either the parent or
guardian of the minor" to prepare a declaration.
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without court intervention." Further, the minor's parents or spouse are
not required to execute a declaration in order to terminate life-sustaining
procedures.7 4 That is, the legislature has made clear by amendment what
was implicit in the original act: a declaration is an additional option
for patients and their families. It did not supplant traditional practice
that allowed nonbeneficial treatments to be withheld based exclusively
on consultation between the physician and the dying patient's family.,'
Section 1299.58.7 addresses a physician's responsibilities with regard
to a terminally and irreversibly ill patient. A physician, aware of the
existence of a declaration or of the decision to withdraw treatment made
by a properly designated surrogate, must certify in writing a diagnosis
of terminal and irreversible illness and arrange for a second physician
to confirm the diagnosis.7 6 The second physician's diagnosis must also
be certified in writing.7 7 A physician who disagrees with the decision to
withdraw treatment must make reasonable efforts to transfer the patient
to another physician.18
The Act includes a grant of partial immunity to health care profes-
sionals. 79 To be entitled to the statutory immunity from criminal and
civil liability, the health care professional must be acting pursuant to a
good faith belief concerning the patient's intention and must be acting
only after a patient has been found to be a "qualified patient." '8 0 In
any proceedings against the health care provider, the burden of proof
73. The amendments deleted La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(C) (Supp. 1986) (requiring cert-
ification by district court) and (D) (requiring appointment of attorney to represent the
minor and permitting an evidentary hearing).
74. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986) now provides, in relevant part:
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require the making of a declaration
for a terminally ill minor. The legislature intends that the provisions of this
Part are permissive and voluntary . . . the making of a declaration pursuant to
this Part merely illustrates a means of documenting the decision relative to
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures on
behalf of a minor.
75. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 145 (encouraging sensible advice from
attorneys and interpretation by courts where natural death bills are enacted to prevent
them from being "a means that limits decisionmaking of patients who have not executed
binding directives pursuant to the act.").
76. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.7(A) (Supp. 1986) provides that the attending physician "shall
take necessary steps to provide for written certification of the patient's terminal and
irreversible condition. ... Section 1299.58.58.2(7) requires a written certification by a
second physician. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1986).
77. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1986).
78. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.7(B) (Supp. 1986).
79. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.8 (Supp. 1986).
80. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.8(A) (Supp. 1986). Subsection (C) provides that such immunity
is inapplicable if the person seeking the immunity did not act in good faith.
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is on the state or, in civil litigation, on the plaintiff to show the lack
of good faith.8
The recent amendments to the Act have expanded the immunity
granted to health care professionals. Section i299.58.8(B) grants the
same immunity as did the original act even if the health care provider
is not acting pursuant to a statutory declaration. 2 That is, the immunity
applies if life-sustaining procedures are withheld or withdrawn pursuant
to "an alternative voluntary means" to the statutory declaration.83
Section 1299.58.9 established penalties for certain violations of the
Act. 84 Subsection (A) provides for civil liability for anyone who..damages
a written declaration or falsifies a revocation s. 8  That is, a person is
civilly liable for keeping a patient alive against his will. Subsection (B)
provides for criminal penalties for a person who forges a declariation
or conceals a revocation. 86 Thus, a person may be prosecuted, presumably
for homicide, if he hastens the death of a critically ill patient. 87
Section 1299.58.10 attempts to clarify the relationship of the Act
to other legal provisions.88 First, it specifically disclaims that the Act
81. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.8(C) (1) (Supp. 1986) provides that immunity shall be available
"unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the person- authorizing or
effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures did not .. . act,
in good faith.
82. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.8(B) (Supp. 1986).
83. Id. This provision would appear to reflect what is already common practice among
prosecutors. See, e.g., Ginex, A Prosecutor's View on Criminal Liability for Withholding
or Withdrawing Medical Care: The Myth and the Reality, in Legal and Ethical Aspects,
supra note 6, at 205, 210.
84. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.9 (Supp. 1986).
85. Specifically, La. R.S. 40:1299.58.9(A) (Supp. 1986) provides: "Any person who
willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, obliterates, or damages the declaration of another
without such declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation or the declaration
of another shall be civilly liable."
86. Specifically, La. R.S. 40:1299.58.9(B) (Supp. 1986) provides:
Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of another or willfully conceals
or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation of a declaration with the intent
to cause the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures contrary
to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby because of such act directly causes
life-sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death thereby to be
hastened may be subject to prosecution under Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950.
87. The reference in La. R.S. 40:1299.58.9(B) (Supp. 1986) to the Louisiana Criminal
Code is not entirely clear, but it presumably authorizes indictment for murder based on
the notion that any shortening of life constitutes homicide. See W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law § 67 (1972). Given that a patient must be diagnosed by two
physicians as terminally and irreversibly ill, such a prosecution for murder appears unduly
harsh. The haishness was mitigated somewhat by an amendment of H.B. 996 which
originally stated that "a person who falsifies or forges the declaration of another ...
shall be subject to prosecution." H. B. 996, Reg. Sess. 1983, § 1299.58.9(B).
88. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10 (Supp. 1986).
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condones euthanasia. Instead, the Act merely eliminates obstacles to the
natural process of dying. 9 Second, for purposes of insurance claims,
withdrawal of life-support systems is not to be deemed the cause of
death. 90 Third, the statute states that its provisions are "cumulative with
existing law pertaining to an individual's right to consent or refuse to
consent to medical or surgical treatment." 91
Thus, the statute creates three classes of adult patients: (1) competent
adults who may prepare written declarations at any time; (2) competent
adults who may make oral declarations, but only if unable to prepare
a written declaration and only after being confronted with a diagnosis
of a terminal and irreversible condition; and (3) incompetent patients
who have been diagnosed as terminally and irreversibly ill and who have
never made declarations, but for whom decisions may be made by
specified surrogates. In all cases, upon proper certification of a terminal
and irreversible illness, the declaration or the surrogates' decision may
be honored.
II. A COMPARISON WITH OTHER NATURAL DEATH ACTS
California enacted the first natural death statute less than ten years
ago.9 2 Subsequently, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia
enacted natural death acts.93 Despite their popularity with state legis-
latures, natural death acts have been subjected to criticism. For example,
Professor Capron, Executive Director of the President's Commission of
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Research,
has observed that such acts are "so cumbersome and restrictive to be
useless at best, and possibly very mischievous." 94 This section examines
Louisiana's act in light of some of those criticisms. A significant majority
of natural death acts9" have been modeled on the California natural
death act96 and a subsequently drafted model act. 97 Thus, those two acts
warrant close scrutiny.
89. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(A) (Supp. 1986). But see infra notes 152-254.
90. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(B) (Supp. 1986).
91. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(C) (Supp. 1986).
92. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (Supp. 1985) (Natural Death Act).
93. See supra note 1.
94. Capron, supra note 8, at 652.
95. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. §§ 39.4501-4508 (1985) (Natural Death Act); Nev.
Rev. Stat. §§ 449.540-.690 (1983) (withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures);
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 97.050.090 (1983) (rights with respect to terminal illness); Tex.
Ann. Civ. Stat. art. 4590(h) (Supp. 1985) (Natural Death Act); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 70.122.010-.122.905 (Supp. 1985) (Natural Death Act).
96. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (Supp. 1985).
97. Medical Treatment Decision Act (Model Bill) §§ 1-8, reprinted in Commission
Report, supra note 1, at 313-17.
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The California act requires a declarant to use a standard form
provided in the act. 98 The form provides that if death is imminent, life-
sustaining procedures should be withheld or removed.99 The declaration
must be re-executed every five years' °° and is binding only if it has been
executed or re-executed at least fourteen days after a patient has been
diagnosed as terminally ill.101 A non-complying directive is not binding
but may be considered as one factor in a physician's decision whether
to withdraw treatment.'12 Further, the statute offers no procedures to
govern cases of incompetent patients who have not executed formal
declarations.
The California act, drafted partially in response to the Quinlan
case," 3 demonstrates Professor Capron's criticisms. The fourteen day
waiting period, for example, often defeats the right recognized by the
statute. The statute requires that a patient be faced with a prognosis
of imminent death and that he then wait fourteen days before executing
a binding declaration." In the interim, many patients will have died.
Prior to death, they may have been forced to accept unwanted treatment.
Alternatively, the patient may become incompetent during the waiting
period, and thereby be disqualified from executing a binding directive. 05
The statute also violates a patient's right to self-determination. By
requiring a prior prognosis of terminal illness, the act implies that a
competent, healthly person cannot decide his own fate. Commentators
are virtually unanimous that competent adults have a fundamental right
to determine their own course of medical treatment.1°6 The California
98. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (Supp. 1985).
99. Id.
100. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code § 7189.5 (Supp. 1985).
101. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (Supp. 1985).
102. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code § 7191(C) (Supp. 1985).
103. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See
Commission Report, supra note 1, at 143 ("Although the California statute was in part
inspired by the situation of Karen Quinlan, . . . it would not apply in a case like hers.")
104. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code §§ 7188, 7191(B) (Supp. 1985).
105. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 142, offers the following criticism of
California's waiting period:
A patient must wait 14 days after being told of the diagnosis before he or she
can sign a directive, which would require a miraculous cure, a misdiagnosis, or
a very loose interpretation of the word "imminent" in order for the directive
to be of any use to a patient .... [A] study of California physicians one year
after the new law was enacted found that only about half the patients diagnosed
as terminally ill even remain conscious for 14 days.
106. Advocates of the right to refuse treatment contend that our society recognizes a
fundamental right of self-determination. See, e.g., Concern for Dying, A Legal Guide to
the Living Will 4 (1979) (discussing rights of competent patients); Commission Report,
supra note 1, at 43 (discussing patient's interest in self-determination). That right is
reflected in the common law doctrine of informed consent, see, e.g., Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); and in the
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act represents a form of unwarranted paternalism because it effectively
denies a patient that right.
Similarly, insistence on a standard form'07 interferes with a patient's
right of self-determination. A declarant may misunderstand the statute's
general language. 08 Thus someone else's understanding of the patient's
"will" becomes determinative of the appropriate course of treatment. 0 9
Even if the patient understands the form, he may want to allow some
forms of treatment which would be discontinued under the terms of
the statute. For example, under some circumstances, artificial feeding
devices," 0 coronary pulmonary resuscitation,"' and respirators"'2 may all
be "life-sustaining" procedures. But a patient may hope to resist CPR
while allowing application of a respirator. The standard form prevents
that flexibility.
Perhaps most troublesome, the California act does not apply in the
most frequently recurring situation-those cases in which decisions must
be made on behalf of incompetent patients who have not prepared
advance directives." 3 The legislature failed to provide for procedures in
such cases. Although this is the area in which courts have most frequently
requested legislative action."14
constitutional right to privacy. See, e.g. Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647, 622-
64 (finding that vegetative patient had constitutional right to privacy). See also La. Const.
art. I, § 5 (1974) (protecting individual's right to privacy). Philosophers have also found
a right of a patient to make his own treatment decisions, grounded in principles of
autonomy and of respect for the person. Contravention of that right is generally an
objectionable form of medical paternalism. See, e.g., J. Childress, Who Should Decide?
162-85 (1982).
107. See, e.g., Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (Supp. 1985).
108. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 137 (advance directive may not dem-
onstrate contemporaneous personal choice), 142-43 (recognizing that decision to execute
living will may be made on hypothetical, not real facts about patient's illness and dying
process), 145 (advantages of "proxy" directives over "instruction" directives).
109. For example, the Act may allow the physician discretion to interpret the directive;
see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90.321(C) (Supp. 1983) (attending physician may rely upon
signed declaration).
110. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (nasogastric feeding
tube may be withdrawn under appropriate circumstances).
I11. See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1977) (court
approval not required before entering No-Code in dying patient's medical chart).
112. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (com-
atose patient may be withdrawn from respirator, consistent with family's determination
of patient's desire).
113. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980)
(involving decision to remove comatose patient from respirator); In re Spring, 380 Mass.
629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (involving decision to terminate dialysis for senile patient);
In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) (involving decision to
enter order not to resuscitate in comatose patient's medical record); In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (involving decision to withdraw nasogastric feeding tube
from senile, but conscious patient).
114. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 486 (1983) (stating that issue had not been adequately addressed by the legislature);
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In response to some of the failings of the California act, the Society
for the Right to Die commissioned a model act.'"' Following Kansas'
lead,"16 several states have adopted that act."17
Unlike the California statute, the Model Act permits a person to
prepare a declaration at any time.'" A patient need not be informed
that he is terminally ill. The directive is valid when executed and does
not require a waiting period."19 Revocation is made extremely easy. 20 A
physician who refuses to comply with a declaration or to transfer the
patient may be found to have acted unprofessionally. 2 The Model Act
also penalizes a person who hastens another's death by falsifying a
declaration or a revocation 22 and provides a non-binding model dec-
laration which specifies that a patient may resist "life-sustaining pro-
cedures" under certain circumstances.'23
While the Model Act avoids some of the glaring inadequacies of
the California act, 24 it is less than perfect. Like the California act, it
fails to establish procedures in cases in which an incompetent patient
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1346 (Del. 1980) (inviting legislature
to enact comprehensive policy governing these matters); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 345,
486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985) (legislature had failed to enact procedures for situation facing
the court).
115. See Rosoff, Living Wills and Natural Death Acts, in Legal and Ethical Aspects,
supra note 6, at 186, 191.
116. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-28, 101-109 (1980).
117. See, e.g., Ala. Code, §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984) (Natural Death Act); D.C. Code
Ann. 6-2401-2430 (Supp. 1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1985).
118. Medical Treatment Decision Act (Model Bill) § 3, supra note 97.
119. Id.
120. Id. at § 4 which provides:
A Declaration may be revoked at any time by the declarant, without regard
to his or her mental state or competency, by any of the following methods:
(a) By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, or burnt, torn, or otherwise
destroyed by the declarant or by some person in his or her presence and by
his or her direction.
(b) By a written revocation of the declarant expressing his or her intent
to revoke, signed and dated by the declarant. The attending physician shall
record in the patient's medical record the time and date when he or she received
notification of the written revocation.
By a verbal expression by the declarant of his or her intent to revoke the
declaration. Such revocation shall become effective upon communication to the
attending physician by the declarant or by a person who is reasonably believed
to be acting on behalf of the declarant. The attending physician shall record
in the patient's medical record the time, date and place of the revocation and
the time, date and place, if different, of when he or she received notification
of the revocation.
121. Id. at § 5.
122. Id. at § 7(C).
123. Id. at § 3.
124. Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code §§ 7035-7195 (1985). See supra notes 92-114
and accompanying text.
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has not prepared an advance directive. 25 Further, while the Model Act
does not mandate the form of the declaration, its sample form is limited
to resisting "life-sustaining" treatment. 2 6 It does not recognize a de-
clarant's right to appoint a surrogate decisionmaker if the declarant
becomes incompetent. That alternative was adopted, for example by the
Delaware legislature, 27 in a provision which has been described as avoid-
ing the "serious shortcomings" of other natural death acts. 28
Louisiana's natural death act, while relying on the Model Act,' 2 9
avoids many of the pitfalls of the earlier acts. Unlike the California
act, the Louisiana statute allows a competent patient to execute a written
declaration at any time and does not require its re-execution. 3 ° The
waiting period provided for in the California statute reflects a concern
that a patient not make a hasty decision, but it also substantially impairs
the patient's ability to make a competent decision about a course of
medical treatment.' By contrast, Louisiana recognizes the patient's right
of self-determination when not faced with a diagnosis of terminal illness.
In place of a waiting period, the Louisiana act makes the revocation
of an advance directive extremely easy.3 2 The Act also gives express
recognition of the right of a competent adult to make an oral declaration
when so incapacitated that he cannot prepare a written document.'
The required formalities limit the possibility that a patient will refuse
painful treatment in a moment of stress.
Unlike both California's act and the Model Act, the Louisiana
legislature has established a procedure for a comatose patient who has
not executed a declaration.' 34 Failure to provide for such cases may do
more harm than good: health care professionals may infer that lack of
legislative recognition of rights of incompetent patients means that no
125. The act is intended only to "recognize the right of an adult person to make a
written declaration .... Medical Treatment Decision Act, supra note 97, at § I.
126. Id. at § 3.
127. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2501(e) (1983).
128. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 145 ("Proxy directives allow patients to
control decisionmaking in a far broader range of cases than the instruction directives
authorized by most existing natural death acts.").
129. Medical Treatment Decision Act, supra note 97. Louisiana has borrowed gen-
erously from the act. Compare, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2 (Supp. 1986) with Medical
Treatment Decision Act § 2; La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3 (Supp. 1986) with Medical Treatment
Decision Act § 3; La. R.S. 40:1299.58.4 (Supp. 1986) with Medical Treatment Decision
Act § 4.
130. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3 (Supp. 1986).
131. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 142-43.
132. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.4 (Supp. 1986).
133. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986).
134. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5 (Supp. 1986).
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such rights exist.' Further, the procedure adopted by the Louisiana
legislature will be expeditious. In most cases, judicial intervention is
unnecessary. If the patient does not have a statutorily designated sur-
rogate, court proceedings are necessary solely for appointment of a
surrogate. 3 6 The statute does not contemplate that the court decide the
underlying medical question or the desires of the incompetent patient.'37
Following the lead of Delaware' and improving on the Model Act, 3 9
the Louisiana legislature had provided not only that its suggested form
is optional, but also that a person may choose to appoint a surrogate
decisionmaker instead of simply listing unwanted treatments.1' ° As dis-
cussed above,' 4' use of a standard form presents difficulties. A person
may sign a form without understanding ambiguous language, or consid-
ering all of the relevant circumstances. The President's Commission's
Report recommends that execution of an advance directive be undertaken
only after discussion with a physician. 42 Short of that, appointment of
a surrogate increases the likelihood that treatment decisions will be made
by a person familiar with the patient's preferences.
Critics have suggested that a natural death act may create more
problems than it solves. 43 As indicated, recent amendments to the Lou-
isiana -act were mandated when health care providers erroneously con-
strued the act as mandatory in cases involving seriously ill minors.' " It
has been argued elsewhere that this interpretation was erroneous. 45 But
that crisis was illustrative of the harm that may be caused by the existence
of a natural death act: the act may be read as the sum of a patient's
rights, rather than merely as a legislative recognition of the validity of
living wills. 46
135. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 145 (such statutes are intended to
establish additional, not exclusive rights).
136. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986).
137. Id.
138. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2502(b) (1983).
139. Medical Treatment Decision Act, supra note 97.
140. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(C) (Supp. 1986).
141. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
142. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 4, 137.
143. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 8, at 652; Commission Report, supra note 1, at
144-45 ("Paradoxically, natural death acts may restrict patient's ability to have their wishes
about life sustaining treatment respected.").
144. See, e.g., Impact Weekly, supra note 70.
145. See Vitiello, supra note 12. See also La. A. G. Opin. No. 85-57 (Jan. 28, 1985).
146. There has been surprisingly little case law involving living wills in jurisdictions
with or without natural death acts. In 1984, the Florida Supreme Court held that, even
absent enabling legislation, a living will was persuasive evidence of how a person would
decide, were he competent to do so. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth,
452 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Fla. 1984). Shortly thereafter, Florida enacted its Life Prolonging
Procedure Act. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 765.01-.15 (Supp. 1985).
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As amended, Louisiana's act avoids that result. 47 The legislature
has made it clear that the statutory procedures are "voluntary," and
that the declaration "is merely illustrative as a means of documenting
a patient's decision relative to withholding or withdrawal of medical
treatment."1 48 Further, the Act is not intended to compel "medically
inappropriate treatment."'4 9 In effect, the Act simply recognizes a per-
son's right to prepare a living will or to have a surrogate do so under
certain circumstances. 50 It implicitly recognizes that patients and their
families have rights apart, from the right to prepare an advance direc-
tive. '
The Louisiana legislature has avoided the worst features of earlier
statutes, such as unnecessarily burdensome procedures. The Louisiana
statute includes an expeditious procedure for withdrawing treatment from
the hopelessly ill, incompetent patient who has not drafted a declaration.
It is appropriately flexible in allowing a patient to choose the form of
her declaration, including the appointment of an agent. The statute's
flexibility is in keeping with the value underlying the right to refuse
treatment-that society should honor an individual's autonomy. It also
makes clear that the legislature does not believe that the Act is the final
word on a patient's rights.
III. LOUISIANA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT AND THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST EUTHANASIA
Like other American jurisdictions,' Louisiana expressly condemns
euthanasia. For example, Article I, section 20 of the Louisiana Con-
stitution states that "no law shall subject any person to euthana-
sia, . . ."Il Louisiana's natural death act explicitly disclaims that the
Act authorizes euthanasia. 54
Some critics have argued that withdrawal of treatment where death
147. Several statutes make clear that the rights secured by the act are cumulative with
other rights, see, e.g., Medical Treatment Decision Act, supra note 97, § 8(d); Cal. Ann.
Health & Safety Code § 7193 (Supp. 1985).
148. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(A) (Supp. 1986).
149. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.IA(C) (Supp. 1986).
150. That is the primary purpose of such statutes. See Capron, supra note 8, at 652.
151. Louisiana already provided that rights created by the act were cumulative with
other rights, La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(C) (Supp. 1986).
152. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8A-10 (1984) (act does not authorize "mercy killing");
Cal. Ann. Health & Safety Code § 7195 (1985) (same); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 3
(1983) (same); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2430 (1985) (same); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.670 (1977)
(act permits no "affirmative or deliberate act or omission which ends life other than to
permit the natural process of dying.").
153. La. Const. art. I, § 20 (1974).
154. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(A) (Supp. 1986).
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is the intended or foreseeable'55 result is euthanasia.5 6 According to that
analysis, courts and legislatures have countenanced euthanasia through
careless analysis of the problem at hand.'" For example, Professor Yale
Kamisar has criticized the Quinlan"' decision as follows: "The New
Jersey Supreme Court, I fear, may have provided euthanasia proponents.
with something that has eluded them for decades-the bridge between
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, between the 'right to die' and
the 'right to kill." ' 15 9 Kamisar contends that we have maintained an
official morality condemning euthanasia, while doctors practice it and
judges approve it "only .. . [by] avoiding the term euthanasia-not the
practice." 60
Louisiana's natural death act may be said, by some, to sanction a
form of euthanasia in violation of Article I, section 20, 61 however, the
constitutional redactors specifically intended to permit withdrawal of
treatment in cases contemplated by the Act. In addition, the right to
refuse treatment is a federally guaranteed right. 62 Therefore, -even if
one concludes that the Act permits a limited form of euthanasia, the
state cannot prohibit exercise of the patient's right to refuse treatment.
A. Article L Section 20
Louisiana's natural death act allows treatment to be withdrawn from
a person who has executed a declaration, 163 and from an incompetent
patient who has not done so.164 The two cases present different issues
under Article I, section 20.
In the first case, a patient who executes a declaration has made
155. Some commentators have argued that a distinction should be drawn between
intended consequences and unintended but foreseeable consequences. See, e.g., C. Fried,
Right and Wrong 7-53 (1978); Jonsen, Traditional Distinctions for Making Ethical Judge-
ments, 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 661, 662-64. That distinction has been rejected elsewhere see,
e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955) (defining intent necessary
to commit a tortious battery as doing an act "for the purpose of causing the contact
... or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact .. . is substantially
certain to be produced."). See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 197 ("the
word 'intent' in the substantive criminal law has generally not been limited to the narrow,
dictionary definition of purpose, aim, or design, but .. . it has often been viewed as
encompassing much of what would ordinarily be described as knowledge.").
156. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 15, at 32-34.
157. Id. at 32.
158. Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647.
159. Kamisar, supra note 15, at 16.
160. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
161. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(A) (Supp. 1985).
162. See infra notes 184-254 and accompanying text.
163. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986) (by written or oral declaration).
164. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5-.58.6 (Supp. 1986).
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clear that under certain narrow circumstances death is preferable to
intensive medical treatment. 6 The Act contemplates withdrawal from
medical treatment; it does not sanction the administration of drugs or
other death-producing agents intended to hasten death. 66 Thus, if the
withdrawal of treatment is a form of euthanasia,167 it is voluntary passive
euthanasia.
The express language of section 20 suggests that the state consti-
tutional prohibition does not include voluntary euthanasia. Section 20
states that "no law shall subject any person to euthanasia, . ''. .16 A
person who voluntarily chooses death has not been subjected to eu-
thanasia.
That conclusion is buttressed by the history of Louisiana's consti-
tutional convention. Professor Hargrave has observed in his compre-
hensive article on the 1973 convention that section 20 "applies to state
action, not to individuals,"'' 69 and that the provision was amended by
the delegates "to make clear that the prohibition is limited to laws
requiring persons to be subjected to euthanasia."'' 7 0 The delegates ex-
pressed abhorrence of a bill unsuccessfully introduced in the Florida
legislature which would have, in effect, compelled certain individuals to
die. 171
Section 1299.58.3 of Louisiana's natural death act does not permit
the state or third parties to compel a person to accept death.' 7 2 It
recognizes a means whereby a person can assert his will "after [he is]
no longer able to participate actively in decisions concerning" his medical
care. 171
165. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986) allows a patient to request withdrawal or
withholding of "life-sustaining procedures." Since the declaration provided is not man-
datory, the declarant may specify whether he wishes to resist all or some life sustaining
procedures. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (Supp. 1986) (declaration "may, but need not,
be in the following form and may include other specific directions."). Some critics, while
conceding that there is a strong case in favor of voluntary euthanasia, believe that voluntary
informed consent is virtually impossible to secure. See, e.g., Kamisar, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 969, 978-1005
(1958).
166. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986) (allowing a person to execute
a directive "directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures" under
certain circumstances).
167. Any discussion of euthanasia is confounded by the varied definitions of that
term. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
168. La. Const. art. I, § 20 (1974).
169. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 63 n.336 (1974).
170. The original provision stated: "No person shall be subjected to euthanasia." Id.
at 63 n.332.
171. Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1973
Verbatim Transcripts, Sept. 8, 1973, at 1189, 1191.
172. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A) (Supp. 1986).
173. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(C) (Supp. 1986).
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The second case, that of the incompetent patient without a decla-
ration, is harder than the case in which a person's desires are memo-
rialized in a declaration. While Louisiana's natural death act is not a
compulsory euthanasia law,'74 it might be argued that the Act does
subject the seriously ill, incompetent patient to euthanasia. That is, the
Act does not require treatment to be withdrawn from seriously ill pa-
tients, but it does give a third party the right to have treatment ter-
minated, possibly leading to the incompetent's death. 75
Constitutional history, however, demonstrates that the act does not
violate section 20. As initially introduced at the convention, section 20
provided that "[n]o person shall be subjected to euthanasia."', 76 That
language was rejected because the delegates "feared that this language
might be construed to prevent a physician from halting extraordinary
life-continuation treatments of a dying patient."'
77
"Extraordinary" treatment is an ambiguous term, 78 but is used
appropriately to refer to medical care in which the burdens outweigh
the benefits to a seriously ill patient. 79 The Act permits a surrogate to
refuse life-sustaining treatment for a "qualified patient,"'' 0 a patient
who has been certified by at least two physicians to be terminally and
irreversibly ill,'' but it does not authorize a denial of treatment that
can reverse the death process or cure the underlying anomaly.1 2 Ad-
ditionally, the Act permits a surrogate to resist treatment for a patient
that almost certainly would be "extraordinary" treatment that, at best,
would only delay the imminent death process. 83 Thus, the Act is con-
sistent with section 20; neither requires all available therapies to be
applied to every patient without regard to the patient's condition.
B. The Right to Privacy
The history of Louisiana's constitutional convention indicates that
the natural death act does not violate Article I, section 20. But that
does not end the inquiry as to whether the Act has authorized euthanasia,
despite the express disclaimer by the legislature.8 4 This section concludes
that the Act does condone a limited form of euthanasia, it rejects efforts
174. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
175. La. R.S. 40.1299.58.5-58.6 (Supp. 1986).
176. Hargrave, supra note 169, at 63 n.332.
177. Id. at 63.
178. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 83-89 (criticizing use of "extraordinary"
and "ordinary" care because of different meanings given those terms).
179. Id. at 87-88.
180. La. R.S. 40.1299.58.5(A); 58.6(A) (Supp. 1986).
181. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1986).
182. See La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(8) (Supp. 1986) (defining "terminal condition").
183. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(8) (Supp. 1986).
184. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(A) (Supp. 1986).
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to distinguish treatment decisions which lead to death from euthanasia,
and argues that a limited form of euthanasia is part of a person's
constitutional right to privacy.
Discussion about euthanasia is confounded by imprecision in defining
that term. It has been defined, for example, as "a painless death,"'' 5
as "mercy killing,'' 8 6 and as "the act or practice of killing individuals
that are hopelessly sick or injured, for reasons of mercy.' ' 87 Those
definitions suggest that euthanasia involves active intervention,' 8 8 as dis-
tinguished from the failure to act to prevent death.
There is considerable evidence that physicians, among others, accept
a distinction between active intervention intended to kill a dying person
and failure to treat the patient to allow the patient to die.8 9 Pediatric
surgeons have admitted publicly that they counsel parents of defective
newborns that they may refuse to consent to surgery that may save the
infant's life, but that does not correct the underlying anomaly. 90 The
same surgeons do not sanction active intervention to bring about a
quicker death.' 9' Some courts have accepted a similar distinction. 92
While the distinction between active and passive euthanasia has
psychological appeal, 93 its logic is suspect. Some advocates of the dis-
tinction argue that the failure to treat a dying patient is not the cause
of the resulting death. 94 In such a case, the argument goes, "the ensuing
185. American Heritage Dictionary 248 (1980). See generally D. Horan & D. Mall,
Death, Dying and Euthanasia 596-601 (1977).
186. Kamisar, supra note 165, at 969.
187. Hargrave, supra note 169, at 63 n.336.
188. For example, famous euthanasia cases which have come to court have usually
involved defendants who have actively intervened to bring about the victim's death. See,
e.g., D. Magine, Death by Choice 23-25 (1974) (citing cases in which the accused has
defended against a charge of murder on the ground of mercy).
189. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 15, at 25-27 (citing example of physician and
parents of seriously ill newborns who accept that distinction).
190. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289
New Eng. J. Med. 890 (1973); Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?, N.Y. Times, Jan.
30, 1972 (Magazine), at 44, 54.
191. See Kamisar, supra note 15, at 27.
192. See, e.g., In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind.
April 12, 1982) (trial court refused to compel surgery for infant suffering from Down's
syndrome and needing life-saving corrective surgery), writ of mandamus dismissed sub
nom., State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S140 (Ind. Sup. Ct. May 27, 1982).
193. See Capron, supra note 8, at 648 ("the distinction [between withholding and
withdrawing treatment] has more to do with psychology than with philosophy.").
194. See, e.g., Quinfin, 70 N.J. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 669-70. There may be contexts
in which a distinction between active killing and passive "allowing to die" may be
important. Active intervention, for example, by injecting air into the victim's blood stream
is likely to result in a sure-kill, Failure to provide antibiotics for a cancer patient who
contracts pneumonia may not result in his death. Similarly, allowing a seriously ill newborn
to starve slowly leaves open a chance that parents will reverse their decision not to treat
the infant or that a third party will intervene. See, e.g., Wilkes, When Do We Have The
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death ... [is the] expiration from existing natural cause.",95
That view is based on a misunderstanding of causation. For example,
were a stranger to unplug a respirator which had supplanted a dying
patient's breathing process, no one would suggest that the strangeri's
conduct was not a factual cause of the patient's death. 96 Yet courts
have sanctioned withdrawal of such treatment by health care providers
in numerous cases. 97 Similarly, were a physician to fail to prescribe
antibiotics for a patient suffering from pneumonia and death were to
follow, no one would suggest that the physician's omission was not a
cause-in-fact of death or that the death resulted merely from natural
causes. 918
Treatment is often terminated despite the possibility that it will
prolong life at least briefly.' 99 Denial of treatment is thus one of many
factual causes which brings about a patient's death at a given moment. 200
As a matter of policy, the law may hold that a person's act or omission
was not the proximate or legal cause of another's injuries. 2°' That does
not mean the person's conduct was not a cause-in-fact. Only if there
is a duty to provide treatment may its withdrawal or denial be said to
proximately or legally cause a person's death. But as long as the treat-
ment would have prolonged the patient's life, its withdrawal or denial
is a cause-in-fact of the patient's death.
Right to Die, Life Magazine, Jan. 14, 1974, at 48, 52 (court order obtained by physician
to treat infant with Downs syndrome, suffering from intestinal blockage). But the certainty
of death does not always depend on whether death results from action or inaction. One
who fails to save an infant in a baby carriage about to roll off a cliff may be far more
effective in bringing about his victim's death than a poor marksman who shoots at his
intended victim from a great distance.
195. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 52, 355 A.2d at 670.
196. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 250 ("one who hastens the
victim's death is a cause of his death"). See also People v. Bonilla, 95 A.D.2d 396, 467
N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1983) (suggesting that motive of person turning off life support
system is relevant to whether subsequent act relieves original actor of criminal liability).
197. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re
P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re Colyer, 99 Wash, 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
198. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 224-25 (discussing criminal liability of physician
who withholds treatment from defective infant). One court has correctly analyzed a situation
where conduct of multiple parties has factually caused a person's death as an issue of
whether the later action is a superseding cause, relieving the original actor of criminal
culpability for the patient's death. In re J.N., 406 A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1979). As with
proximate cause, superseding cause is a policy question, not solely a factual question. W.
Prosser & R. Keeton, The Law of Torts 301-02 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
199. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at I ("For almost any life-threatening
condition, some intervention can now delay the moment of death.").
200. W. Prosser & R. Keeton, supra note 198, at 264 ("In a philosophical sense, the
consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to
the dawn of human events and beyond.").
201. Id. See also Commission Report, supra note I, at 68-69 (stating that value
judgments underlie a decision to identify a factual cause as a legal cause).
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A more common rationale for a distinction between active and
passive euthanasia is based on the traditional rule that the law does not
punish omissions, while it does punish acts. 2 There are infamous cases
in which the law has sanctioned an immoral failure to act to save
another person.20 3 But the difference between law and morality can be
overstated. A person is legally culpable if he is under a duty to act
and his failure to act results in harm.20 4 For example, if a parent
intentionally fails to secure life-saving treatment for his child, he may
properly be indicted for murder.2 ' Or if a parent through ignorance
fails to secure medical treatment for his child, he may be guilty of
negligent homicide if the child's death results from the omission.2°6 A
physician's failure to treat the child may similarly be criminal if he is
under a duty to care for the patient.2 7 That is, there is universal
agreement that a patient's family and treating physician are generally
under a duty to provide appropriate medical care, and thus, the failure
to provide that care may be homicide if the patient's death results from
an omission to treat.20 8 The patient's family or physician are not ex-
202. See, e.g., Jonsen, supra note 155, at 661-62 (the distinction between acts and
omissions "is a very important feature of decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment.").
See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 183 (stating the blackletter rule that
"Igienerally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when the aid can
be rendered without danger and inconvenience to himself.").
203. One of the most infamous cases was that of Kitty Genovese whose murder was
witnessed by many of her neighbors, none of whom intervened or called the police. See
Who Are Responsible for the Death of Miss Genovese?, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1964, at
1, 38, reprinted in J. Golstein, A. Dershowitz, & R. Schwartz, Criminal Law: Theory
and Process 742 (1974). See also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128
(1907) (man owed no duty to his mistress to secure medical assistance when she became
critically ill due to ingestion of poison during a weekend spree in his home); Yania v.
Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (no duty in civil suit where defendant invited
business visitor to jump into pool and let him drown).
204. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 182-90 (discussing exceptions to
rule that one has no legal duty to aid another).
205. See Annot., 10 A.L.R. 1137 (1921) (discussing convictions for homicide where
liability was based on failure to secure medical or surgical assistance).
206. See, e.g., Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676, aff'd on rehearing, 142
N.W. 670 (1913) (Manslaughter conviction upheld when son's death resulted from failure
to secure medical care despite father's claim of lack of funds and inability to speak
English.).
207. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 224-35 (discussing various theoretical bases for
liability of physicians and hospitals).
208. Apart from the obvious need to encourage parents to secure and physicians to
provide appropriate treatment to seriously ill patients unable to secure aid for themselves,
reliance on a distinction between acts and omissions (or withdrawing and withholding
treatment) is not satisfactory for two other reasons. In many cases, it is unclear whether
the chosen course of treatment entails action or inaction. See W. Prosser & R. Keeton,
supra note 198, at 374 ("In theory the difference between [an act and omission] is fairly
clear, but in practice it is not always easy to draw the line and say whether conduct is
active or passive."). Attention would necessarily focus on whether the physician or parent
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onerated even if the patient has consented to the decision to withhold
treatment. Quite simply, a person cannot consent to his own murder. 209
As indicated above, 210 some observers have distinguished between
providing ordinary care and withholding extraordinary care from a dying
patient. Death resulting from a denial of ordinary care would amount
to a form of euthanasia or homicide, as distinguished from the denial
of extraordinary care.
For example, the Catholic church has long maintained that: "No
one can make an attempt on the life of an innocent person without
opposing God's love for that person, without violating a fundamental
right, and therefore without committing a crime of the utmost gravity
. 2... 121 That principle prohibits suicide as "equally as wrong as
murder.121 2 It also recognizes that euthanasia may result from "an
omission which of itself or by intention causes death ....
Despite its absolute prohibition against euthanasia and suicide, the
church has distinguished cases in which treatment may morally be ter-
minated. In the past, Catholic moralists relied on a distinction between
ordinary or morally necessary treatment and extraordinary means which
might properly be resisted. 214 More recently, the church has referred to
"due proportion in the use of remedies. '25 In either case,
it will be possible to make a correct [moral] judgment as to
the means by studying the type of treatment to be used, its
degree of complexity or risk, its cost and the possibility of using
it, and comparing these elements with the result that can be
expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and
his or her physical and moral resources. 216
This analysis is limited to cases where death is "imminent in spite of
the means used" and where treatment "would only secure a precarious
and burdensome prolongation of life .. .. 217
had acted, rather than failed to act, when the relevant inquiry ought to be on the actor's
duty to the patient. See Capron, supra note 8, at 650. Further, if it were made more
difficult to withdraw treatment (an act) than to withhold treatment (an omission), physicians
would be hesitant to apply treatment initially, fearing that it could not be withdrawn
later if it proved unsuccessful. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 75.
209. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 408.
210. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
211. Scared Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration of Euthanasia
(May 5, 1980), reprinted in Commission Report, supra note 1, at 300, 302 [hereinafter
cited as Declaration of Euthanasia].
212. Id.
213. Id. at 303.
214. Id. at 305. See also address by Pope Pius XII to anethesiologists on November
24, 1957 cited in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 30-34, 355 A.2d at 658.
215. Declaration of Euthanasia, supra note 211, at 305.
216. Id. at 305-06.
217. Id. at 306.
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Such a rule may be difficult to apply in many cases because the
variables to be balanced evade precise measurement.2 But the underlying
distinction has received wide support.2t 9 Louisiana's natural death act
would appear consistent with that distinction. 220
As persuasive as that rationale may ultimately be to decide cases
appropriate for nontreatment, 221 it does not explain why the resulting
death is not a form of euthanasia. 22  It must be conceded that "ex-
traordinary" treatment will prolong a patient's life to some measurable
extent. 223 Or, in other words, its denial will hasten a person's death.
The law has long recognized that any shortening of life of another
constitutes homicide and that the perpetrator cannot defend on the basis
that the victim's death was imminent from other causes. 224 Thus, a denial
of extraordinary treatment may lead to a merciful death; death has
come sooner to a patient beyond cure. But hastening a death in such
a case, even by passive means, 221 is euthanasia. 2 6 Even if withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures is euthanasia, it would be inappropriate to
deny a patient the right of self-determination and to compel a dying
patient to accept burdensome treatment. As discussed in more detail
218. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 88 (suggesting that benefits and burdens
may be viewed differently from one patient from another).
219. See, e.g., id. See also Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (1983) (rejecting extraordinary/ordinary distinction and adopting
proportionate benefit analysis); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 370-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234-
37 (1985) (adopting Commission's analysis of proportionate benefits).
220. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
221. See Commission Report, supra note I, at 88-89 (analysis of problem in terms of
proportionate benefits is morally persuasive).
222. See Kamisar, supra note 15, at 33.
223. See La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(4) (Supp. 1986) (defining a "life-sustaining procedure"
as one which "would serve only to prolong the dying process").
224. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 532-32 (it is homicide to accelerate
death even though the victim is already dying or about to be executed). That rule may
be appropriate in general where, even if one's victim was going to die anyway, the
perpetrator may have been unaware of that fact and, therefore, represented a threat to
the community, but it frustrates decisionmaking on behalf of seriously ill patients. See
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (reversing
superior court which had held that doctors who had removed respirator and artificial
feeding device could be indicted for murder because any shortening of life amounts to
criminal homicide).
225. It is important to recognize that the Act authorizes withholding of treatment (an
omission) and withdrawal of treatment (an act). La. R.S. 40: 1299.58.3 (Supp. 1986). See
also supra note 208.
226. Such a recognition is intellectually honest. Indeed many commentators believe
that the active and passive distinction is morally irrelevant. See Maguire, supra note 188
(arguing in favor of active as well as passive euthanasia). See also J. Fletcher, Morals
and Medicine (1954). Even Professor Kamisar concludes in his forceful critique of the
Quinlan decision that "(slome passive euthanasia should be permitted, but only when
'honest' or 'straightforward' euthanasia would be permitted." Kamisar, supra note 15,
at 32.
[Vol. 46
LOUISIANA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT
below, 227 it is now generally recognized that a person has a right to
refuse medical treatment, a right within the constitutional right to pri-
vacy.28 As with other privacy rights, 229 the state may override a person's
right to refuse treatment and may compel treatment if the state's interests
are sufficiently compelling.230 Thus, the state generally has the right to
intervene to prevent a suicide2 11 or to compel treatment of a mother in
the interest of a dependent infant.2 32 But it cannot be seriously argued
that the state has a compelling interest in requiring dying patients to
accept unwanted, burdensome treatment. 23  Thus, because the right to
refuse treatment is guaranteed by the Constitution, 2 3  a state law pro-
hibiting euthanasia would have to yield to exercise of the federal right
if a conflict existed. 235
Once a court recognizes that a competent patient has a right to
determine a course of treatment, it does not necessarily follow that a
patient will exercise that right. 236 Indeed, there is ample evidence that
227. See infra notes 264-97 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
Staz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647; In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619 (C.P. Northhampton County 1973).
229. See, e.g., Roe. v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65, 93 S. Ct. 705, 732-33 (1973)
(interest in life of viable fetus sufficiently compelling to permit regulation of third trimester
abortions).
230. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-55, 486 A.2d at 1223-26 (discussing four state
interests to be balanced against patient's right to privacy). See also Commissioner of
Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 261, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1979) (state interest
sufficient to justify order compelling state prison inmate to submit to kidney dialysis).
231. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162; Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350, 486
A.2d at 1224. See also Greenburg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide,
49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227 (1974) (attempted suicide justifies active intervention by public
officials and at least temporary confinement).
232. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978, 84 S. Ct 1883 (1964) (decision to order blood transfusion for nonconsenting
Jehovah's Witness justified, in part, by interest of patient's seven-month old infant).
233. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225 ("the right to self-deter-
mination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests, and competent persons
generally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of death.").
234. The Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutional status of the right to
refuse medical treatment. See comment, The Right to Die-A Current Look, 30 Loy. L.
Rev. 139, 140 (1984). Recently, however, a federal district court became the first federal
court to recognize a right of a competent adult patient suffering from a terminal condition
"to demand the cessation of life support once begun." Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical
Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 1985).
235. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (invalidating state statute
prohibiting abortion in violation of constitutional right to privacy).
236. Indeed, one of the values underlying a right to refuse treatment is that of self-
determination. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 26. See also Cantor, Privacy
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many competent patients choose some intrusive treatments that others
may consider too burdensome.237 It also does not necessarily follow that
the right to refuse treatment extends to incompetents.
Interestingly, most of the leading cases stating that a competent
patient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment have involved
incompetent patients.238 Courts have relied on principles of equal pro-
tection to extend the same right to the incompetent patient. 2 9 The
obvious difficulty with that position is that "an affirmation of a com-
atose patient's independent right of choice ... would ordinarily be
based upon her competency to assert it.''240 In Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court resolved that dilemma by resorting to the substituted
judgement test: "The only practical way to prevent destruction of her
right is to permit the guardian and family of [the incompetent patient]
to render their best judgment" as to her choice concerning continued
treatment .
241
In some cases, the substituted judgement test poses no difficulty.
For example, a person may have discussed with close associates whether
he would want to be sustained on a respirator if he became comatose. 24 2
Or a dying patient may have drafted a living will even though the
relevant jurisdiction had not adopted enabling legislation. 213 Or the com-
atose patient may have been active in right-to-die organizations. 244 The
surrogate might readily find evidence of the patient's desires.
and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 233, 250 (1977)
(governmental recognition of right to refuse treatment reflects concern for individual self-
determination).
237. See Kamisar, supra note 15, at 8-12 (discussing evidence that most patients resist
an "easy" death).
238. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983) (comatose patient); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1980) (comatose patient); Custody of Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982)
(seriously ill newborn); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (senile patient);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977) (severely retarded resident of state facility); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985) (senile patient in nursing home); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (comatose
patient).
239. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
240. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.
241. Id.
242. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981) (companion case, involving 83 year-old Brother Fox, who became
comatose during surgery occurring shortly after he expressed support for the Quinlan
result to members of his Catholic order).
243. See John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (patient's
living will, even absent enabling legislation, was found to be persuasive evidence of patient's
desires concerning discontinuance of treatment).
244. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (family
sought to withdraw respirator from comatose patient who was an active member of local
euthanasia society).
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Other cases pose more substantial difficulties. Some patients may
never have expressed their views on whether they would want to be
sustained on a respirator.2 45 Even clearer, incompetence prevents many
patients from forming views on the subject. Infants2 46 and the severely
retarded247 quite obviously have not formed values that permit a surrogate
to infer the patient's choice.
In the latter class of cases, rather than compelling burdensome and
futile therapies, some courts have insisted that the substituted judgment
test applies without regard to the nature of the patient's incompetence.2 48
But the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that
in such cases, the test amounts to a best interest test.2 49 In effect, an
incompetent patient has a constitutional right to be treated in a manner
consistent with his best interests. 2 0 Thus, treatments that provide no
net benefit may be withdrawn.
245. The Quinlan case raises an interesting issue. The court rejected evidence of
statements made by Karen Quinlan because they were so "remote and impersonal [that
they] lacked significant probative weight .... Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
Nonetheless, the court remanded to allow the patient's guardians "to render their best
judgement, . . . as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances." Id. at 42,
355 A.2d at 664. Professor Kamisar has argued that because "[p]resumably the guardian
and family of Karen had presented to the court everything they knew bearing on Karen's
supposed choice," the family could make its ultimate decision only on the "basis of the
same remote and impersonal previous conversations" found inconclusive by the court.
Kamisar, supra note 15, at 6-7. He argues, therefore, that the court authorized involuntary
euthanasia because evidence of her intent was absent. Unquestionably, there are many
patients who have not expressed their views on life-support systems. More recently,
however, -the New Jersey Supreme Court has rethought the facts in Quinlan:
[Alny ... information bearing on the person's intent . .. may be [an] appro-
priate aid in determining what course of treatment the patient would have
pursued. In this respect, we now believe that we were in error in Quinlan ...
to disregard evidence of statements that Mrs. Quinlan made to friends concerning
artificial prolongation of the lives of others who were terminally ill.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1230. further, it established separate standards
(a) for patients who have made a clear statement; (b) for patients for whom there is
"some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the treatment," where
that evidence is less than an "unequivocally expressed" desire to terminate treatment; and
(c) for patients who have never expressed a view or were never able to do so. Id. at
365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
246. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (involving
need to get judicial order to terminate treatment of dying newborn).
247. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977) (chemotherapy might be refused on behalf of severely retarded sixty-
seven year-old ward of the state).
248. Id.
249. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 710 n.10, 434 N.E.2d 601, 608 n.10 (1982)
(in such a case, a substituted judgement test is consistent with a best interest test); See
also Guthiel & Appelbaum, Substituted Judgement: Best Interests in Disguise, Hastings
Center Rep., June 1983, at 8. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that for
incompetents who have never developed a view on the subject, the surrogate is to apply
the best interest test. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365-66, 468 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (1985).
250. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1231-32. Cf. City of Akron
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Under the foregoing analysis, Louisiana's natural death act neither
authorizes impermissible conduct nor offends Louisiana's constitutional
prohibition. Most importantly, Article I, Section 20 was not intended
to prevent withdrawal of extraordinary care. 25' Further, the weight of
authority supports the view that withdrawal of life-support systems from
dying patients under the proper auspices2 2 is permissible, 253 and even if
characterized as euthanasia, a patient may be freed from inappropriate
treatment because the constitutional right to privacy encompasses medical
treatment decisions.2 54
IV SOME RECURRING PROBLEMS
A. Dying Patients Whose Lives Can Be Saved
Critics have argued that natural death acts are so restrictive that
they may be useless or even mischievous. This section discusses some
recurring cases where natural death acts provide no guidance. Specifi-
cally, it focuses on the dilemma created (1) when a seriously ill patient
refuses surgical removal of gangrenous tissue and (2) when a person
resists life-saving medical treatment because of religious principles. But
once it is concluded that those patients are beyond the scope of natural
death acts, it must be determined whether nonetheless they may resist
treatment.
Similar to many other statutes,255 Louisiana's natural death act allows
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments only if a patient is certified as
a "qualified patient," a person suffering from a '"terminal and irre-
versible condition. ' 25 6 The statutory definition of a "terminal and ir-
reversible condition" demonstrates the Act's narrow applicability. A
patient is terminally and irreversibly ill only if he suffers from a condition
"which, within reasonable medical judgement, would produce death and
the application of life sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone
the moment of death. 25 7 Thus death must be reasonably certain to
follow in the near future even if treatment is provided.
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481, (right to privacy
protects immature minor's right to an abortion if in her best interests).
251. See supra note 174-83 and accompanying text.
252. That is not to suggest that, were an unauthorized stranger to withdraw the life
support system, she would not be criminally liable. See supra note 196. For example,
prior to her death, Karen Ann Quinlan had to be cared for behind a heavy metal security
door to protect her from thrill seekers and from "fanatics [who] have threatened to 'put
her out of her misery'." The Commercial Appeal, May 26, 1985, at El, col. 1. Karen
Ann Quinlan died approximately ten years after she became comatose. USA Today, June
12, 1985 at Al, col.2.
253. See supra note 210-20 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 228-35, 238-50 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8A-3(5)(1984); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7187(e)
(Supp. 1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28, 102(e) (1980).
256. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1986).
257. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(8) (Supp. 1986).
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The Act is inapplicable to the two recurring cases mentioned above.
For example, courts have been confronted frequently with Jehovah's
Witnesses whose faith prohibits blood transfusions. 21 In cases that have
come to court, usually at the insistence of a hospital attempting to
compel treatment, the patient's death without transfusions is probable. 25 9
But treated and supplied with blood, the patient has a good chance of
full recovery. 260 Thus, that patient falls outside the Act because treatment
would cure the underlying anomaly, not simply prolong the dying proc-
ess. Likewise, a patient suffering from gangrene may be near death if
the condition is untreated. 26' But surgical removal of a patient's affected
extremity may offer a continued life for an undetermined time. Life
may be impaired because the patient may be an invalid, but surgery
has not merely prolonged the dying process. 262
Courts have addressed those problems, usually without legislative
guidance.2 61 Cases preceding Roe v. Wade26 and In re Quinlan2 65 did
not rely on a constitutional right to refuse treatment.266 But several
principles have emerged from more recent cases. Our society has long
recognized a fundamental right to bodily integrity: "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law." ' 267 That principle underlies the
258. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978, 84 S. Ct. 1883 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.
Conn. 1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks Estate, 32 III. 2d
361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc.
2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1965). Their refusal to accept blood transfusions
is based on the Biblical prohibition that "Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh."
See Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall
Prevail?, 10 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.10.
259. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1007 (patient faced almost
certain death without transfusions).
260. Id. (full recovery probable if given transfusions).
261. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 284, 383 A.2d 785, 787
(Morris County Ct. 1978) (patient would die within three weeks without surgery).
262. Id. ("probability of recovery from amputation is good and the risks involved are
limited"). See also Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
263. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied,
331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978, 84 S. Ct. 1883 (1964); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978).
264. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
265. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
266. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978, 84 S. Ct. 1883 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.
Conn. 1965); In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
267. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 1001 (1891).
See also Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914) (every competent adult "has right to determine what shall be done with his
own body"), overruled, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
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doctrine of informed consent, "a primary means developed in the law
to protect this personal interest in the integrity of one's body." 2 68
Following Roe v. Wade, 269 courts have gone beyond common law
doctrines. 270 The New Jersey Supreme Court found in reliance on Roe
that the constitutional right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass
a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circum-
stances," '27' even if death results from that decision.
As with other privacy rights,2 72 however, the right to refuse medical
treatment is not absolute. It may be overridden by a compelling state
interest.2 73 As recently observed by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
"[c]ourts and commentators have commonly identified four state interests
that may limit a person's right to refuse medical treatment: preserving
life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profes-
sion, and protecting innocent third parties. 21 74
The most important factor is preservation of human life. 275 The
state has an interest in the life of the patient and in preserving the
sanctity of life generally. 276 But prolongation of life alone is not sufficient
to override a person's exercise of his constitutional right. Were it oth-
erwise, the state could compel any life-prolonging treatment, no matter
how marginal the benefit to the patient. 277 Further, when a competent
268. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985).
269. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 706 (1973).
270. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). Only
the New York Court of Appeals has not followed Quinlan's constitutional holding; instead,
it found a similar right to refuse treatment based on the common law. In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
271. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
272. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65, 93 S. Ct. 705, 732-33 (1973) (state
interest in life of viable fetus sufficiently compelling to allow regulation of third trimester
abortions).
273. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (holding that state interests were insufficient to compel
treatment for dying patient); Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 261,
399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1979) (holding that state interest in prison discipline was sufficient
to compel prisoner to accept dialysis).
274. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223.
275. Id.
276. See Cantor, supra note 236, at 249.
277. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (1977):
The interest of the State in prolonging a life must be reconciled with the interest
of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of that prolongation. There is a
substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved where
the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where, as here, the
LOUISIANA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT
patient has chosen, in effect, to die, the state has a lesser interest in
protecting the patient's life than in cases where a surrogate may not
adequately protect the patient's interest in continued existence.2" In such
a case, the abstract concern in sanctity of life does not outweigh the
patient's decision. 279
One might insist that a refusal of medical treatment, even that
offering only limited benefit to the patient, is a form of suicide. 280 A
patient who consciously chooses to resist treatment does so with the
knowledge that treatment would prolong his life at least briefly. Although
a technical similarity exists between refusing treatment and suicide, these
cases can be distinguished.2 8 ' The New Jersey Supreme Court has sum-
marized frequently relied on arguments to distinguish refusal of treatment
from suicide:
Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to
take its natural course; if death were eventually to occur, it
would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and
not the result of a self-inflicted injury ...
In addition, people who refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment may not harbor a specific intent to die, ... rather, they
may fervently wish to live, but to do so free of unwanted medical
technology, surgery, or drugs, and without protracted suffer-
ing....
Recognizing the right of a terminally ill person to reject
medical treatment respects that person's intent, not to die, but
issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual
that life may be briefly extended. Even if we assume that the State has an
additional interest in seeing to it that individual decisions on the prolongation
of life do not in any way tend to "cheapen" the value which is placed in the
concept of living, . . . we believe it is not inconsistent to recognize a right to
decline medical treatment in a situation of incurable illness. The constitutional
right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the sanctity of individual
free choice of self-determination as fundamental constitutents of life. The value
of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but
by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice.
278. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349-50, 486 A.2d at 1223 (state interest in protecting
life of competent dying patient is less than interest in protecting actual or potential life
that cannot adequately protect itself).
279. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742,
379 N.E.2d at 426 (refusal to honor patient's choice lessens value of life). See also Cantor,
supra note 236, at 250 ("Government tolerance of the choice to resist treatment reflects
concern for individual self-determination, bodily integrity, and avoidance of suffering,
rather than a depreciation of life's value").
280. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 87, at 532-33 (it is homicide to accelerate
death even though the victim is already dying or about to be executed).
281. See, e.g., Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 211, at 300-07 (distinguishing
suicide from death resulting from dying patient's refusal to accept burdensome treatment).
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to suspend medical intervention at a point consonant with the
"individual's view respecting a personally preferred manner of
concluding life." . . . The difference is between self-infliction
or self-destruction and self-determination.2 82
While courts have included preservation of the integrity of the
medical profession as a state's interest, 28 3 that interest will seldom, if
ever, be a sufficient condition to compel treatment. 2 4 Medical ethics do
not require treatment in all cases: "[Physicians distinguish between
curing the ill and comforting and easing the dying .... "285 More
importantly, even if a patient might be successfully treated, the "moral
and professional imperative, at least in cases of patients who were clearly
competent, presumably would not require doctors to go beyond advising
the patient of the risks of foregoing treatment and urging the patient
to accept the medical intervention. 2 8 6 In effect, a corollary of our
society's insistence on informed consent is that doctor may know best,
but he must respect a patient's foolish disregard of his advice. 28 7
Finally, the state has an interest in protecting innocent third parties
dependent on the patient for support. 28 A review of the case law indicates
that this factor has been relied upon often. 28 9 Thus, that a parent's
death will deprive a dependent child of financial and emotional support
may justify a court's decision to order treatment. 290
282. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351-52, 486 A.2d at 1224. Cf. Engelhardt & Malloy,
Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A critique of Legal Sanctions, 36 W.L.J. 1003, 1013-20
(1982) (contending that arguments in favor of constitutional right to privacy support
legality of suicide and assisted suicide).
283. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353-354, 486 A.2d at 1224-25. See also In
re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
284. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
at 743-747, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all
efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather, as indicated
in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the
dying are more often in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the
right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent
with existing medical mores: such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity
of the medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients
or the state's interest in protecting the same. It is not necessary to deny a right
of self-determination to a patient in order to recognize the interests of doctors,
hospitals, and medical personnel in attendance on the patient.
285. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1225, citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
at 47, 355 A.2d at 667.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (criticized in Paris, supra
note 258 at 17-20); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. 111. 1972).
289. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1225.
290. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1008 (parent's death would
amount to the "most ultimate of voluntary abandonments").
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Applying the same analysis, courts have refused to order surgical
removal of gangrenous extremities from seriously ill, competent adults.2 9'
The patients in those cases were old, expressed little interest in life, and
abhorred the idea of being an invalid.2 92 Because a balancing of interests
is necessarily imprecise, the result might differ if the court were asked
to compel similar treatment for a parent of small children, especially
if the parent was young enough to adjust to life as an invalid.2 93
Courts have not always been consistent in their treatment of Je-
hovah's Witnesses. 9 But, perhaps because of concern about religious
freedom, 295 some courts have refused to authorize health care providers
to give transfusions over the patient's refusal to consent.2 96 Many of
the cases can be lined up as follows: the patient has a right to refuse
treatment; that right will be honored if the patient's decision is clearly
communicated by the patient when competent; that right will be over-
ridden to protect innocent third parties, most notably dependent chil-
dren.2 97
As indicated, the Louisiana act does not resolve how such cases
should be decided. 29 However, some natural death statutes have pro-
291. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978). See also In
re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619 (C.P. Northampton County 1973) (upholding competent
patient's decision to refuse mastectomy). Critical to a court's decision is a finding that
the patient is competent to refuse treatment. See, e.g., State Dept. of Human Services
v. Northern, 653 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 436 U.S. 923 (1978)
(upholding order authorizing guardian to consent to amputation of incompetent patient's
gangrenous feet, overriding patient's refusal to consent).
292. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d at 1234:
(The patient] has been unhappy since the death of her husband ... she does
not wish to be a burden to her children; ... she does not believe that the
operation will cure her; ... she does not wish to live as an invalid or in a
nursing home; . . . she does not fear death but welcomes it.
293. Compare Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (court refused to order chemotherapy for sixty-seven year-
old severly retarded patient) with Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053
(1978) (court ordered similar treatment for two year-old child with similar prognosis to
Saikewicz).
294. Compare John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971) with In re Brooks' Estate, 32 III. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
295. An individual's beliefs are given absolute protection. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 81 S. Ct. 1680 (1961) (state constitutional provision requiring public official
to declare belief in God held unconstitutional violation of first amendment). But the Court
has permitted some regulation of religious activity. See, e.g., Brounfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 1144 (1961) (Court upheld Sunday closing laws despite impact on
Orthodox Jews). It is less than clear when a state may regulate religious activity. See J.
Nowak, R.'Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 1057-63 (2d ed. 1983).
To date, however, the transfusion cases have not been squarely decided on religious
freedom grounds. Id. at 1067-68.
296. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks' Estate, 32
Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
297. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353-54, 486 A.2d at 1225-26.
298. See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
duced "mischief" in such cases.2 99 Health care professionals may construe
the statute as the exclusive source of patients' rights. Therefore, because
not protected by the statute, the patient may be compelled to litigate
or to accept unwanted medical treatment. Further, a court may similarly
misconstrue the statute. For example, a Florida trial court recently denied
a petition to have a feeding tube removal from a patient who had been
in a persistently vegetative state for three years.?° According to one
account, the court did so because Florida's Life Prolong Procedure Act
of 198430 "clearly expresses the legislature's view that life-prolonging
procedures that may be withdrawn or withheld do not include the
provision of sustenance. "302 Once a litigant relies on a constitutional
right to privacy,3 3 the court's insistence that the act does not authorize
withdrawal of treatment is, of course, a non sequitur.
Spurred by a similar misunderstanding of Louisiana's natural death
act,30 4 the legislature quickly amended the Act to prevent such mischief. 05
Thus the Act now provides that its provisions are "merely illustrative, 30 6
and are not "the exclusive means by which life-sustaining procedures
may be withheld or withdrawn . . . ,,301 Even prior to this amendment,
the Act made clear that its provisions were cumulative with other rights
possessed by the patient.30 The legislature's intent is now clear: the Act
authorizes the use of living will, but does not impair additional rights
of patients to informed consent or to constitutionally protected privacy.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to intimate its view of whether
it accepts Quinlan's constitutional analysis of patients' rights.30 9 But
given the almost universal recognition of that right,310 counsel for health
care providers might reasonably expect Louisiana to follow that analysis.
At a minimum, it cannot be contended that the sum of patients' rights
are to be found in Louisiana's natural death act.
299. See Capron, supra note 8, at 652. See also Vitiello, supra note 12.
300. Concern for Dying Newsletter, Vol. 11, no. 2, at 3 (Spring 1985).
301. F.S.A. §§ 765.01 - .15 (Supp. 1985).
302. Concern for Dying Newsletter, Vol. 11, no. 2, at 3 (Spring 1985).
303. Florida's Supreme Court has recognized that right. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy
Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980), aff'g 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
304. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1 (Supp. 1986). For a discussion of that crisis, see Vitiello,
supra note 12.
305. 1985 La. Acts No. 187, amending La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1-58.10 (Supp. 1985).
306. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(A) (Supp. 1986).
307. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(C) (Supp. 1986).
308. La. R.S. 40:1299.59.10(C) (Supp. 1986).
309. See In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) (while citing Quinlan, the court
did not resolve constitutional question because case was decided under La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1
(Supp. 1986)).
310. See supra notes 271-90 and accompanying text. See also In re Georgetown College,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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B. Removal of Artificial Feeding Devices
Treatment withdrawal cases decided in the past ten years were preoc-
cupied with whether or not a respirator might properly be withdrawn
from a seriously ill patient. 3 ' That issue has been laid to rest. The issue
at the cutting edge of medical ethics today is whether health care
professionals may withdraw artificial feeding devices from patients for
whom continued nourishment provides little benefit. 3 '2 This section re-
views Louisiana's natural death law, its "Infant Doe" statute, 3 ' and
case law from other jurisdictions to suggest how that issue might be
resolved in Louisiana.
Louisiana's natural death act permits a patient or his surrogate to
refuse "life-sustaining procedures" under certain circumstances. 1 4 That
term is defined as "any medical judgement, would serve only to prolong
the dying process." 3 5 The Act is silent on whether an artificial feeding
device is a "life-sustaining procedure." 3 6
One might argue that artificial feeding devices are not within the
scope of the Act because they are not medical interventions. Quite
obviously, eating is not a medical procedure or intervention. But artificial
feeding devices have more in common with medical procedures than
they do with the act of "consuming" or "devouring" food.3 t7 As
observed by one court, "[A]rtificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes,
gastrostomics, and intravenous infusions are significantly different from
bottle-feeding or spoonfeeding-they are medical procedures with in-
herent risks and possible side effects, instituted by skilled healthcare
providers to compensate for impaired physical functioning." '318
The Louisiana act also provides that the medical intervention be
311. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
312. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984); In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See also Capron, Ironies and Tensions in Feeding and
Dying, Hastings Center Rep., Oct. 1984, at 32; Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always
Be Given Food and Water?, Hasting Center Rep., Oct. 1983, at 17.
313. La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1-36.3 (Supp. 1985).
314. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A), 1299.58.5, 1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986).
315. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(4) (Supp. 1986).
316. Id. During April 6, 1984 hearings before the subcommittee of the House of
Representative's Committee on Civil Law And Civil Procedure, representatives expressed
concern that the Act might be construed as allowing withdrawal of artificial feeding devices
(author's personal observation).
317. See American Heritage Dictionary 156, 225 (1980) (defining "eat" as "to con-
sume", defining "consume" as "to eat up; devour").
318. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
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one that "would serve only to prolong the dying process." 3 t 9 Intravenous
feedings are not intended to cure the patient, but merely to replace or
to supplement a person's inability to feed himself through the normal
ingestion process.3 20 For the terminally and irreversibly ill patient, such
a device merely prolongs the dying process. It would appear, therefore,
that the Act permits withdrawal of such devices.
Before that conclusion is accepted, however, some other factors
should be considered. A number of commentators have insisted that
feeding is distinct from other forms of care.3 2' Despite some resemblance
to medical care, feeding is charged with "emotional symbolism."3 2
Infants cannot feed themselves though they breathe without assistance.
Nurturing and caring are often expressed through feeding.3 23 Perhaps
for that reason, some legislators expressed concern during hearings on
Louisiana's natural death act that it might be construed as allowing
denial of food to a dying patient. 324
Elsewhere, commentators have expressed consternation over the den-
ial of nutrition to seriously ill newborns.3 25 For example, in 1982, health
care providers and parents of a Down's syndrome infant agreed to deny
the infant surgery to repair blockage of his esophagus and a fistula
between the infant's stomach and esophagus.3 26 A trial court refused to
order surgery and the Indiana Supreme Court refused to intervene.127
The infant's slow death by starvation and dehydration32 s led to a prompt
reaction critical of the decision, including promulgation of regulations
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services aimed
at requiring nutrition and medical care for handicapped newborns. 29
319. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(4) (Supp. 1986).
320. Commission Report, supra note I, at 190.
321. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See also J. Piccione, Last Rights: Treatment and Care
Issues in Medical Ethics (1984).
322. Capron, supra note 312, at 34.
323. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
324. See supra note 316.
325. See, e.g., Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, 9 Hum. Life
Rev. 7, 9-10 (1983); Kamisar, supra note 15, at 23-28; Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthanasia
of Defective Newborns, 58 J. Pediatrics 883 (1976).
326. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12,
1982), writ of mandmus dismissed sub nom., State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482
S 140 (Ind. Sup. Ct. May 27, 1982).
327. See Mathieu, The Baby Doe Controversy, 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 605. See also J.
Robertson, The Rights of the Critically Ill 88 (1983); Commission Report, supra note 1,
at 224 n.92.
328. The infant's condition made normal feeding impossible. Mathieu, supra note 327,
at 605.
329. See Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nour-
ishment; Notice to Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982). These regulations
and subsequent regulations are criticized in Mathieu, supra note 327, at 607-26; Vitiello,
The Baby Jane Doe Litigation and Section 504: An Exercise in Raw Executive Power,
17 Conn. L.Rev. 95 (1984).
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Louisiana also responded quickly by enacting an "Infant Doe"
statute.330 Although medical treatment may be withheld under certain
circumstances,"' the Act states: "No infant born alive shall be denied
or deprived of food or nutrients, water, or oxygen by any person
whomsoever with the intent to cause or allow the death of the child
for any reason .... ''132 Elsewhere, the Act permits a child333 to be
withdrawn from a life support system "or other medical treatment" if
the child is "in a profound comatose state" and "has no reasonable
chance of recovery. 33 4 On the other hand, there is an absolute pro-
hibition against denial of food, water, and oxygen; on the other, certain
medical treatment may be withdrawn. Thus, it would appear that at
least in its "Infant Doe" statute, the legislature has distinguished between
nutrition and medical treatment. 35
An analysis of Louisiana's natural death act as consistent with the
"Infant Doe" statute does not end the inquiry. If the constitutional
right to privacy encompasses decisions regarding medical treatment, leg-
islation that impairs that right must obviously fail.33 6 Thus, even if the
legislature were to prohibit withdrawal of artificial feeding devices from
dying patient's, a court might find that such an act violated a patient's
fundamental right to privacy.337 Whether artificial feeding devices may
be withdrawn has been addressed by several courts.33 A consensus has
330. La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1-36.3 (Supp. 1986).
331. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1(C) (Supp. 1986) (parents and physician may
discontinue medical treatment for child in irreversible coma); La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1(D)
(Supp. 1986) (parents and physicians are not required to provide treatment which lacks
sufficient medical benefit to the child).
332. La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1(A) (Supp. 1986).
333. The Act was apparently intended to apply to seriously ill newborns. See, e.g.,
Preamble ("[rielative to nutritional or medical deprivation of infants"). But elsewhere,
the Act refers generally to children. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1 (Supp. 1986) ("Infants
born alive and other children."); La. R.S. 40:1299.36.I(B) (Supp. 1986) (refering to "minor
child").
334. La. R.S. 40:1299.36.1(C) (Supp. 1986).
335. Health care providers face a similar problem in determining whether an oxygen
tent is "medical treatment" which may be terminated. Difficulty arises because La. R.S.
40:1299.36.1 (Supp. 1986) prohibits denial of oxygen under all circumstances.
336. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (holding state statute
prohibiting abortion violative of individual's right to privacy).
337. Congress has enacted legislation to prevent withdrawal of medical treatment from
certain seriously ill newborns. See H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), amending
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (Supp. 1982). That
legislation may be subject to constitutional challenge. See Vitiello, supra note 329, at 154-
59.
338. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984); In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Recently, a Florida trial court held that artificial feeding
devices could not be withdrawn from a comatose patient. See Concern for Dying Newsletter,
Vol. 11, no. 2, at 3 (Spring 1985).
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begun to emerge that artificial feeding devices may be withdrawn under
the same analysis that justifies denial of other medical treatment."3
In re Conroy3 4° is the first such decision by a state supreme court
and provides extensive discussion of the relevant ethical considerations.
Claire Conroy was adjudged incompetent because of an organic brain
syndrome.3 4' During Ms. Conroy's hospitalization due to dehydration,
her treating physician inserted a nasogastric feeding device "that extended
from her nose through her esophagus to her stomach, ' 3 2 which was
subsequently left in place even after her return to the nursing home in
which she was confined.3 43 Subsequently, her guardian sought a court
order permitting removal of the device, an act which would lead to Ms.
Conroy's death.344 The trial court granted the order,3 45 but was subse-
quently reversed by the appellate division.3 46 In the interim, the patient
died.34 7 The supreme court reversed the appellate court and indicated
that but for the patient's death a remand would have been in order.3 48
The court reviewed the considerable case law and commentary since
its decision in Quinlan,349 and reaffirmed its holding that a person has
an "interest in freedom from nonconsensual invasion of her bodily
integrity," which, on the facts of the case before it, outweighed any
countervailing state interests.350 It also extended its decision in Quinlan,
that a guardian may make appropriate medical decisions on behalf of
comatose patients, to incompetent patients generally."5 '
The court first discussed incompetent patients whose preference about
treatment withdrawal might be ascertained: "[W]e hold that life-sus-
taining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent
patient when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused
the treatment under the circumstances involved." '352 The court indicated
that the patient's actual or subjective preference might be determined
in several ways. The court gave express recognition to the "living will"
339. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484; In re Hier, 18 Mass.
App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
340. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
341. Id. at 336, 486 A.2d at 1216.
342. Id.
343. Efforts to wean Ms. Conroy from the device were unsuccessful. Id. at 337, 486
A.2d at 1217.
344. Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216.
345. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (Ch. Div. 1983).
346. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983).
347. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342, 486 A.2d 1209, 1219 (1985).
348. Id. at 388, 486 A.2d at 1244.
349. Id. at 342-54, 486 A.2d at 1219-26.
350. Id. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1266.
351. Id. at 358-61, 486 A.2d at 1228-29.
352. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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as probative evidence, even absent enabling legislation."3 It also indicated
that an oral directive, a durable power of attorney, or even a discussion
between the patient and some other party, might serve as a basis to
show the patient's choice. 5 4 Further, the court indicated that the patient's
decision might be inferred from his religious beliefs or from a "consistent
pattern of conduct with respect to prior decisions about his own medical
care." 3"
The court also addressed directly a problem discussed above,35 6 whether
one can withdraw treatment from an incompetent patient whose pref-
erence cannot be clearly ascertained.35 7 Here the court drew some fine
lines when it articulated two separate tests for those incompetent patients:
Under the limited-objective test, life-sustaining treatment may
be withheld or withdrawn from a patient in Claire Conroy's
situation when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient
would have refused the treatment, and the decision-maker is
satisfied, that it is clear that the burdens of the patient's con-
tinued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life
for him .... This limited-objective standard permits the ter-
mination of treatment for a patient who had not unequivocally
expressed his desires before becoming incompetent, when it is
clear that the treatment in question would merely prolong the
patient's suffering ...
In the absence of trustworthy evidence, or indeed any evi-
dence at all, that the patient would have declined the treatment,
life-sustaining treatment may still be withheld or withdrawn from,
a formerly competent person like Claire Conroy if a third, pure-
objective test is satisfied. Under that test, as under the limited-
objective test, the net burdens of the patient's life with the
treatment should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that
the patient derives from life. Further, the recurring, unavoidable
and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment should
be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment
would be inhumane 58
353. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229. The court cited with approval the Florida Supreme
Court decision in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984), 98 N.J. at 361 n.5, 486 A.2d at 1229 n.5.
354. 98 N.J. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
355. Id.
356. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
357. 98 N.J. at 363-65, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
358. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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The court expressly endorsed a proportionate benefit analysis in such
cases."'
The court then analyzed artificial feeding devices in terms of those
principles. It concluded that, apart from emotional symbolism of food,
those devices are medical procedures.160 Thus, "withdrawal or with-
holding of artificial feeding, like any other medical treatment, would
be permissible if there is sufficient proof to satisfy the subjective, limited-
objective, or pure-objective test." ' 361
The New Jersey court's analysis is more thorough than that of other
courts which have addressed the problem, but it does reflect the con-
sensus among appellate courts.3 62 Further, that approach is consistent
with the view of many medical ethicists:
The problem that many have in deciding how to regard feeding
... is that its symbolic role as part of "caring" is so predom-
inant that it becomes impossible to place it into a realistic
appraisal of a patient's medical needs .... [Als the courts have
... recognized, we should not be insensitive to either the real
or the symbolic harm that is done when patients without prospect
of recovery or of human interaction are held on the cusp of
death by feeding tubes.3 63
It is important to recognize that Louisiana's natural death act does
not resolve whether a patient or his surrogate may resist artificial feeding
devices. The language of the Act seems to allow that result, but other
evidence suggests that the legislature did not intend to go that far.316
This writer suggests, however, that the weight of reason and judicial
authority favors treating artificial feeding devices as a form of medical
treatment which, under appropriate circumstances, may be resisted.
V. CRITICISMS OF LOUISIANA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT
Recent amendments to Louisiana's natural death act have eliminated
some of the confusion feared by critics of natural death acts generally.
Those amendments make clear that people in Louisiana may execute
living wills resisting specified treatment or appointing a surrogate,3 65 and
that the Act is intended only to supplement other means of effectuating
359. Id. at 369-72, 486 A.2d at 1233-35 (accepting the analysis of the Commission
Report, supra note 1).
360. Id. at 372-73, 486 A.2d at 1236.
361. Id. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
362. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484; In re Hier, 18 Mass.
App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984).
363. Capron, supra note 312, at 34-35.
364. See supra notes 314-35.
365. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3 (Supp. 1986).
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patients' rights.366 This section addresses two problems with the Act.
First, this writer believes that the legislature erred when it enacted section
1299.58.5(A)(3)-(6), governing procedures in the absence of a declaration,
to require unanimity among multiple surrogate decisionmakers.3 67 Second,
the Act is unnecessarily restrictive and, arguably, unconstitutional in its
treatment of minors. 368
A. Family Unanimity
Section 1299.58.5(A) provides for appointment of a surrogate de-
cisionmaker if an incompetent patient has not made a declaration.3 69
The statute provides, in descending order, that a judicially appointed
tutor or curator,310 spouse, 37' adult child,3 72 parent,371 sibling, 37 4 or other
relative 37" shall be empowered to act on behalf of the incompetent patient.
As introduced in an earlier legislative session, section 1299.58.5(A)(3)
stated that the decision to withdraw treatment was to be made by "[a]n
adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more than one child,
by a majority of the children who are reasonably available for consul-
tation. ' 37 6 Prior to passage, the bill was amended to require unanimous
agreement among the children and other surrogate decisionmakers. In
event that unanimity is lacking, apparently the family must have recourse
to the courts prior to withdrawal of treatment. 377
Obviously, forcing the case into court will increase expense. Worse,
many families will have insufficient funds to litigate the appointment
of a surrogate decisionmaker.3 78 Failure to litigate will result in the
366. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1(A) (Supp. 1986).
367. See infra notes 369-88 and accompanying text.
368. See infra notes 389-435 and accompanying text.
369. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986)..
370. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(1) (Supp. 1986).
371. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(2) (Supp. 1986).
372. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(3) (Supp. 1986).
373. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(4) (Supp. 1986).
374. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(5) (Supp. 1986).
375. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A)(6) (Supp. 1986).
376. H.B. 996, Reg. Sess. 1983, § 1299.58.5(A)(3).
377. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986) now provides, in relevant part:
When a comatose or incompetent person or a person who is physically or
mentally incapable of communication has been certified as a qualified patient
and has not previously made a declaration, any of the following individuals in
the following order of priority, if there is no individual in a prior class who
is reasonably available, willing and competent to act, may make a declaration
on the qualified patient's behalf ....
378. The statute does not require a hearing on the merits; that is, the court will not
be required to determine the appropriate course of treatment. Id. But the proceedings
may be protracted if the family members are already divided over the appropriate course
of treatment; it follows that they will also divide on who is the appropriate surrogate.
Thus the judicial proceeding will often not be ministerial.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
continuation of potentially unnecessary treatment. Even when family
members seek judicial appointment, the statute does not provide for an
expedited hearing or expedited appeal.37 9 Thus, unnecessary treatment
will often be continued during the course of protracted litigation. The
statute applies only to "terminally and irreversibly" ill patients, that is,
patients for whom the dying process is merely prolonged by treatment. 80
Even brief delay will often make moot the family's application for
appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker.
Those disadvantages might be offset if the unanimity requirement
resulted in better decisionmaking. But it is easy to imagine situations
in which the unanimity requirement will give leverage to an unreasonable
dissenter within the family who dissents because of his own needs, rather
than for the patient's benefit. 8' Thus, the rule may impair good de-
cisionmaking.
Further, given other protections in the bill, any benefit of the
unanimity requirement is likely quite small. Even if all family members
agree, several conditions must be met before life-support systems can
be withdrawn from an incompetent patient. The patient must be in-
competent and have failed to prepare a directive;38 2 he must be terminally
and irreversibly ill as certified by two physicians,38 and only treatment
that prolongs dying may be withdrawn.38 4 Thus, patients covered by the
Act are the seriously ill for whom continued treatment promises little
or no benefit. Treatment offering no net benefit to the patient is difficult
to justify.
Further, the requirement of medical certification provides a built-in
deterrent to hasty decisionmaking. Family members may improperly wish
a quick death for a patient still capable of a continued, if limited,
existence. But physicians are unlikely to conspire to bring about the
379. Id.; cf. La. R.S. 40:1299.36.3 (Supp. 1986) (providing for expedited proceedings
in cases involving seriously ill newborns).
380. See La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(A); 1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986).
381. Cf. Swanson v. Swanson, 121 I11. App. 2d 182, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970) (plaintiff
sought damages for emotional distress resulting from his brother's deliberate refusal to
inform him of his mother's death).
382. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986).
383. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.7(A) (Supp. 1986) requires that an attending physician "at
the request of the proper person as provided in La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5 or La. R.S.
40:1299.58.6, shall take the necessary steps to provide for written certification of the
patient's terminal and irreversible condition, so that the patient may be deemed to be a
qualified patient as defined in La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2." La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp.
1986) defining a "qualified patient" requires that the patient be certified as terminally
and irreversibly ill by two physicians.
384. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(A) (Supp. 1986) (authorizing that "life-sustaining proce-
dure" to be withdrawn). A life-sustaining procedure is a "medical procedure or intervention
which, within reasonable medical judgment, would serve only to prolong the dying process."
La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(4) (Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 46
1985] LOUISIANA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT
death.385 The attending physician's written diagnosis must be confirmed
by a second physician,38 6 increasing the attending physician's motivation
for accuracy. Especially when physicians are on notice that a minority
of family members do not want treatment withdrawn, they will no doubt
be aware of a possible lawsuit by those disgruntled family members.387
That risk will also motivate an accurate diagnosis.
As enacted, section 1299.58.5(A)(3) benefits dissenting family mem-
bers. But those benefits are gained at the expense of a majority of the
family members and worse, at the expense of the seriously ill, incom-
petent patient. Since the statute allows withdrawal only of treatment
offering little or no benefit and only after due consideration by at least
two physicians, other precautions are unnecessary. Although not without
some disadvantages, a rule allowing a majority family members to decide
if treatment should be withdrawn would have served the patient and
his family better than the bill as enacted.3 8
B. Decisionmaking on Behalf of Minors
Section 1299.58.6 was substantially modified by recent amend-
ments.38 9 Those amendments eliminated a requirement that a district
court certify a declaration made on behalf of a minor.39 Further, the
amendments make clear that a minor's representative3 9' does not have
to prepare a declaration before inappropriate treatment may be with-
385. The Act provides no protection for a physician who actively intervenes to bring
about a patient's death, La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10(A) (Supp. 1986) (prohibiting "mercy
killing or euthanasia"), or who does not act in good faith concerning the decision to
terminate treatment, La. R.S. 40:1299.58.8 (Supp. 1986) (providing "good faith" immunity
under certain circumstances).
386. See supra note 383.
387. An absence of reported cases on point is explained by a lack of compensable
damages. In one recent case, however, Louisiana's Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
an award of loss of love and affection to parents of a semicomatose child whose death
was hastened by the defandant hospital's negligence. See Taylor v. Charity Hosp., 466
So. 2d 736 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
388. Cf. Commission Report supra note 1, at 127-28 (recommending that one surrogate
be appointed and noting that "the Commission believes that the health care practitioner
is responsible for determining who should act as the patient's surrogate").
389. See 1985 La. Acts No. 187, § 1299.58.6, amending La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp.
1985).
390. See S.B. 271, Reg. Sess. 1984, § 1299.58.6(D). It is important to observe that
the procedures were required only if a surrogate wanted to prepare a declaration; but a
declaration was intended only as one means of making a decision on behalf of a dying
minor. See A. G. Opin. No. 85-57, Jan.28, 1985, at 4-5.
391. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A) (Supp. 1985) provides that a spouse who has attained
majority, the parents of the minor, or her guardian may qualify as the appropriate
decisionmaker(s).
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drawn.392 However, these amendments did not resolve the conflict be-
tween a minor's right to privacy and his surrogate's ability to veto the
exercise of that right.
Section 1299.58.6 establishes several prerequisites before a declaration
can be made on behalf of a terminally and irreversibly ill minor.3 93 In
contrast to its treatment of adults,3 94 the statute applies only to "qual-
ified" minors; that is, minors already diagnosed as terminally and ir-
reversibly ill.195 A minor cannot draft his own declaration, even if he
is competent and emancipated. Instead a declaration may only be ex-
ecuted on his behalf by a spouse who has attained majority,3 96 or by
a parent or guardian.3 97 A spouse may not execute a declaration if he
is aware of his minor spouse's desire to continue treatment. 398 Conversely,
even if the minor desires termination of treatment, the spouse apparently
retains complete veto power over the minor's decision. 399 Similarly, a
parent or guardian may not execute a declaration on behalf of the minor
if the other parent or guardian dissents, even if the minor desires
treatment terminated. 400
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a person has a con-
stitutional right to refuse medical treatment or whether an incompetent
patient has a constitutional right to be withdrawn from treatments that
a surrogate believes the patient would resist.4 0 1 But state courts have
been virtually unanimous in finding the right to refuse medical treatment
to be within a person's constitutional right of privacy.4 12 It is, therefore,
reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court would follow that line
of reasoning.
392. The Act now provides:
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require the making of a declaration
or living will for a terminally ill minor. The legislature intends that the provisions
of this Part are voluntary and making of a declaration pursuant to this part
is merely illustrative as a means of documenting the decision relative to with-
holding or withdrawal of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures on
behalf of a minor. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986).
393. Id.
394. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2 (Supp. 1986) (an adult may prepare a declaration at any
time).
395. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A) (Supp. 1986) (providing that the act applies to "a minor
. . . certified as a qualified patient"); La. R.S. 1299.52.2(7) (Supp. 1986) (defining "qual-
ified patient" as one diagnosed as "terminally and irreversibly" ill).
396. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A)(1) (Supp. 1986).
397. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(A)(2) (Supp. 1986).
398. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(1) (Supp. 1986).
399. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(2) (Supp. 1986).
400. Id.
401. See supra note 234.
402. See supra notes 269-90 and accompanying text. One federal district court has
recently joined this trend. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452
(D.D.C. 1985).
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Once one concludes that an adult has a constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment, it does not necessarily follow that a court will accord
the same right to a minor. Majority is a precondition for the exercise
of some rights. 40' Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has held that a right
may be extended to a minor subject to conditions inapplicable to adults.4
The question is whether minors enjoy a right to privacy.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed that question in the
context of medical treatment, there is substantial precedent in the abor-
tion cases. Because Roe v. Wade has been viewed by state courts as
controlling on the general issue, 40 ' Roe's progeny would seemingly pro-
vide courts guidance on the rights of minors.
The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that a minor has a
constitutional right of privacy, including a right to an abortion.4 Third
party consent has been a more difficult issue. For example, in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 40 7 the Supreme Court invalidated a Missouri
statute requiring parental consent for all unmarried minors under the
age of eighteen. There, the Court observed that "[T]he state does not
have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient,
regardless of the reason for withholding the consent. '40
That Danforth created an absolute bar to third party consent was
soon put in question. In Bellotti v. Baird,409 the Court abstained in
order to give the state court an opportunity to interpret an ambiguous
statute. It was unclear whether the Massachusetts statute permitted a
parental veto or simply expressed a preference for parental consultation.
Subsequently, the Massachusetts statute was declared unconstitutional
when the same parties returned to the Supreme Court,4 1 0 but the Court
divided on the issue of the extent to which a third party might veto a
minor's decision to have an abortion.
403. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971) (right
to trial by jury not required in juvenile proceedings).
404. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981) (limiting the
right of a minor to procure an abortion); Carey v. Population Serv. Int., 431 U.S. 678,
97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977) (recognizing the right of minors to access to information about
contraceptives but suggesting that use of contraceptives for their intended purpose might
be punished); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967) (due process applies to
juvenile proceedings but not necessarily to same extent as to adult proceedings).
405. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 1, 355 A.2d 647.
406. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
407. 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
408. Id. at 74, 96 S. Ct. at 2843.
409. 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1976).
410. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
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In a plurality opinion, Justice Powell argued that a state may
properly limit some constitutional rights of minors because of "the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing." 4  But, unlike dissenting Justice White,4 2 the plurality
did not validate a complete bar to a minor's decision to have an abortion.
According to Justice Powell, a statute must provide prompt judicial or
administrative proceedings at which a minor might prove that she is
mature enough to make a decision to abort without supervision of her
parents or the court.4 3 Even if immature, a minor may still procure an
abortion unless the minor fails to secure parental consent and the court
finds that the abortion is not in the best interest of the minor. 4 4
More recently, the Court invalidated a Missouri statute requiring a
physician to obtain "the informed written consent of one of [the] parents
or ...guardian" of a minor under the age of 15, unless she obtains
a court order authorizing the abortion. 41  Justice Powell wrote for a
majority of the Court:
In Bellotti v. Baird . . . (Bellotti II), a majority of the Court
indicated that a State's interest in protecting immature minors
will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental
or judicial .... The Bellotti II plurality cautioned, however, that
the state must provide an alternative procedure whereby a preg-
nant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to
make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her imma-
turity, an abortion would be in her best interests. . . . Under
these decisions, it is clear that Akron may not make a blanket
determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too im-
mature to make this decision or that an abortion never may be
in the minor's best interests without parental approval.4 6
Thus, the Court has developed some guidelines for the exercise of
a minor's right of privacy. It is clear that such a right exists. It is
subject to a compelling state interest in the health of minors. Further-
411. Id. at 663, 99 S. Ct. 3043 (Justice Powell's plurality opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist).
412. Id. at 656-57, 99 S. Ct. at 3048
413. Id. at 643-44, 99 S. Ct. at 3048.
414. Id. at 649-50, 99 S. Ct. at 3051-52.
415. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439, 103
S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1983) (citing Akron Codified Ordinances ch. 1870.05(B)).
416. Id. at 439, 103 S. Ct. at 2497-98. Despite joining Justice Powell's opinion in
City of Akron, four justices dissented in a companion case, Planned Parenthood v.
Ashcraft, 462 U.S. 476, 494, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (1983). Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, objected to the Misouri statute because it "permits
a parental or a judicial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion."
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more, the state has a sufficient interest in promoting the family rela-
tionship to justify a requirement that notification of a decision to abort
be provided to the unemancipated minor's parents. But the state cannot
permit a parental veto. Instead, it is now settled that a state must give
the minor an opportunity to prove that she is sufficiently mature to
decide for herself and even lacking maturity, she is entitled to a court
ordered abortion if the abortion is in her best interest. 41 7
Judged in light of these principles, some of the requirements of
section 1299.58.6418 are unconstitutional. A state may treat minors dif-
ferently from adults, based on the vunerability of children, their im-
mature decisionmaking capabilities, and the traditional role of parents
in child rearing. 4t9 Thus it might be appropriate to limit a minor's ability
to make a declaration at any time. Prior to a diagnosis of terminal
illness, a minor's consideration of the question would seem "too remote
and impersonal. ' 420 But the Louisiana statute never permits a minor to
make a declaration on his own behalf.
Instead of recognizing the minor's right under some circumstances,
section 1299.58.6 gives the minor's spouse or parents an absolute veto
over the minor's exercise of his right to refuse medical treatment.4 21
Thus, one can easily imagine a seventeen year-old suffering from terminal
cancer who finds his condition so painful that he would rather die. His
decision is accorded no weight under the statute unless he has a spouse
no longer a minor or parents, all of whom support his decision.
By contrast, because the right to an abortion is a personal right of
the woman, the putative father lacks the authority to veto the decision
to abort the fetus.422 Similarly, the Court has rejected states' efforts to
allow a parental veto. 423 However, the Court has recognized a limited
third party veto. 424 A court may refuse to allow a minor to procure an
417. 462 U.S. at 439-40, 103 S. Ct. at 2497-98.
418. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp. 1986).
419. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
420. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653. This aspect of the Quinlan case
has recently been disapproved by that the New Jersey Supreme Court in connection with
incompetent adults. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 362-63, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (1985).
421. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(2) (Supp. 1986). The common law traditionally required
parental consent before a minor could be treated. Prosser & Keaton, supra note 198, at
115. But that requirement has been eroded and the law has increasingly recognized a
mature minor's right to consent. W. Prosser, J. Wade, & V. Schwartz, Torts 104 n.8
(7th ed. 1982).
422. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
423. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.
Ct. 2481 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). Cf. H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981) (upholding a Utah statute requiring a
physician to give notice to a minor's parents before the physician performed an abortion.)
424. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.
Ct. 2481 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcraft. 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
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abortion but only after a finding that she is too immature to make the
decision and that the abortion would not be in her best interest. 2
Not only is section 1299.58.6 potentially violative of a minor's right
to privacy, but it also makes little sense in terms of the underlying
policy of the Act. Natural death acts are intended to give living wills
legal effect.42 6 A living will is evidence of the patient's desires concerning
his treatment.4 2 Even when a surrogate is authorized to decide on behalf
of an incompetent, 428 the surrogate should attempt to determine how
the incompetent patient would decide if he were able to speak in his
own behalf. 429 When probative evidence of the patient's preference is
unavailable, the surrogate should determine whether treatment is in the
patient's best interest. 4 0
Section 1299.58.6 allows family members to express their preference
concerning treatment for the dying patient.43  A dissenting parent or
spouse may veto a mature minor's clearly stated preference to terminate
treatment.4 32 Further, the Act does not suggest that surrogates ought to
try to make a decision consistent with the patient's preferences or best
interests.43  Conceivably, a dissenting party may prevent a declaration
from being prepared based on that party's own interests,434 rather than
those of the patient.
425. Akron Center for Reproduction Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481; Bellotti,
443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035.
426. Capron, supra note 8, at 652. Such legislation serves additional purposes: it
clarifies, for example, whether health care providers are entitled to good faith immunity
from suit; whether death resulting from termination of treatment is suicide for purposes
of life insurance. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 140.
427. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-61, 486 A.2d 1209, -1229 (1985):
We hold that life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an
incompetent patient when it is clear that the particular patient would have
refused the treatment under the circumstances involved. The standard we are
enunciating is a subjective one, consistent with the notion that the right that
we are seeking to effectuate is a very personal right to control one's own life
[The patient's] intent might be embodied in a written document, or "living
will," stating the person's desire not to have certain types of life-sustaining
treatment administered under certain circumstances.
428. See La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3 (C)(1) (Supp. 1986)(explicitly authorizing the patient
to make a proxy directive).
429. See supra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
430. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (1985) (discussing
treatment for patient's who have not expressed a view concerning a proposed course of
treatment). See also Commission Report, supra note I, at 134-36 (advocating application
of best interest standard for patients whose desires cannot be ascertained).
431. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6 (Supp 1986).
432. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(2) (Supp. 1986).
433. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.6(B)(2) (Supp. 1986) (providing only that if one
has noticed of opposition, the surrogate may not make a declaration).
434. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 91-94 (discussing problems that may
prevent effectuating decision of a seriously ill patient, including inability to secure co-
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The legislature has proven its readiness to remedy the Act when it
has caused confusion, 43' and it is hoped that it will modify section
1299.58.6 to prevent an arbitrary, third party veto of a patient's right
to be free from burdensome treatment. The same end might be achieved
through litigation. But litigation can be obnoxious in such cases where
physicians and family ought to devote their energy and resources to
caring for the dying patient.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Especially since recent amendments, Louisiana's natural death act
is flexible and enlightened. It avoids many of the pitfalls of earlier
natural death acts. 43 6 Consistent with patients' self-determination, it makes
living wills legally binding, and it permits a declarant to appoint a proxy
decisionmaker or to specify specific unwanted therapy. 4 " Further, it
establishes procedures to allow execution of a declaration on behalf of
incompetent patients. 438 Some problems remain with the Act, especially
with its treatment of terminally ill minors. 4 9 It is this writer's hope that
the legislature will remedy those difficulties.
Significantly, the Act has made clear that the rights it establishes
are cumulative with other rights."0 In order to more fully define those
rights, the preceding discussion reviewed some recurring situations ad-
dressed by courts in other jurisdictions. 44' The logical conclusion to be
drawn is that those cases outside the scope of the natural death act
should be decided by reference to a patient's constitutional right to
privacy consistent with a clear majority of decisions reached in sister
jurisdictions.44 2
operation of others). Some commentators have argued that, at least in cases where third
parties have an interest in the death of a seriously ill patient, that benefit to third parties
is irrelevant to a medical decision based on a patient's best interests. See, e.g., Robertson,
supta note 7, at 239-43.
435. See 1985 La. Acts No. 187, amending La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1-.58.8 (Supp. 1986).
436. See supra notes 92-151 and accompanying text.
437. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (Supp. 1986).
438. La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5-58.6 (Supp. 1986).
439. See supra notes 389-434 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 255-364 and accompanying text.
442. Id.
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